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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF “IDEAL
VICTIMS”: ASSAULTED WOMEN’S “IMAGE PROBLEMS” IN LAW

MELANIE RANDALL*
In large part, the limits of current legal responses [to battered women] are
rooted in the same persistent structural inequities and biases which underlie
battering itself.1

I. INTRODUCTION
A significant amount of public attention and legal intervention in the past
few decades has focused on the issue of violence against women and children,
and especially on domestic violence. This attention and increased public
concern is a direct achievement of several decades of activism, scholarship,
and advocacy undertaken by those concerned both with ending violence
against women and achieving equality rights for women generally.2 Yet most
mainstream social and legal responses to the problem of violence against
women, especially violence against women in intimate relationships, remain
inextricably bound up with and shaped by incomplete and distorted
representations of the nature, causes, and effects of that violence.3 As a result,
some of the ways domestic violence is addressed in the law – even those ways
expressly aimed at remedying the defects and inadequacies of traditional legal
responses – inadvertently end up reinforcing the problems they seek to rectify.
Two examples of this are found in stereotypical representations of women
who are subjected to violence in their intimate relationships. Both of these
representations rely on the construction of categories of victims of domestic
violence that misapprehend and stigmatize women’s ways of coping with

* Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, and Scotiabank Professor, Centre for Research on
Violence Against Women and Children, University of Western Ontario. I would like to thank the
editors, in particular John M. Challis, of Saint Louis University Public Law Review for the
invitation to contribute to this issue and for their excellent assistance with finalizing this
manuscript. Thanks also to Dr. Lori Haskell and Professor Dale Ives for their helpful comments
and to Angela McCallum and Yola Hamzo for research assistance.
1. Evan Stark, Re-Presenting Woman Battering: From Battered Women Syndrome to
Coercive Control, 58 ALB. L. REV. 973, 979 (1995).
2. See id. at 976-77.
3. Id. at 979-80.
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intimate violence and its effects on their lives.4 The first of these is the legal
deployment of the victim who suffers from the “battered woman syndrome,” a
diagnostic category sometimes used as evidentiary support for the self-defence
claims of women who, in fear for their own lives, have killed their violent
partners. It is specifically drawn upon to address the often asked question
about why assaulted women who have ended up killing their violent spouses
did not “just leave” their abusers instead.5 The second is the victim who
recants and/or who refuses to “cooperate” in the prosecution of her violent
male intimate.6
Both of these categories of domestic violence “victims” share a set of
problematic assumptions about how women who have experienced intimate
violence typically react. They share, most fundamentally, a failure to
recognize that the decisions made by assaulted women who kill their violent
partners to save their own lives, and those who refuse to “cooperate” with
criminal prosecutions of their batterers, may be making decisions which are
both reasonable and rational when grasped within the particular circumstances
of their lives and the social conditions which shape those circumstances.7
Most importantly, these representations of domestic violence “victims” reveal
fundamental discordances between the way in which domestic violence is
understood and processed in criminal justice system and the way in which it is
lived and negotiated in the context of assaulted women’s lives.8
In this paper, I argue that the use of the “battered woman syndrome” in law
represents a double-edged sword. To the extent that it captures the
psychological dimensions and harms inflicted by being subjected to violence in
an intimate relationship, the “syndrome” has provided critical evidence
supporting the self-defence claims of battered women who kill their violent
partners. But to the extent it explains the difficulties battered women have
leaving their violent partners in terms of a purported psychological incapacity
and lacks an acknowledgment of the powerful social forces which inhibit
women’s very opportunities for “leaving,” the “syndrome” is a profoundly
inadequate conceptualization. Given that there are more effective strategies for
educating courts about the contexts and effects of intimate violence, I argue

4. See id. at 1000; see, e.g., Linda G. Mills, Killing Her Softly: Intimate Abuse and the
Violence of State Intervention, 113 HARV. L. REV. 550, 589-90 (1999).
5. Stark, supra note 1, at 973, 981.
6. Mills, supra note 4, at 590.
7. See generally Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in
Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1996) (discussing the difficulty of
encouraging a more public response to domestic violence while preserving women’s autonomy
from excessive state intervention).
8. See generally id.; Mills, supra note 4 (discussing the need to reconsider whether
mandatory state intervention policies serve the best interest of all battered women).
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that the use of the “battered woman syndrome” ought ultimately to be
abandoned in the legal arena.
In the same way that the “battered woman syndrome” is an inadequate and
distorted conceptualization of intimate violence in women’s lives, there is a
distinct impression, backed up by an academic literature on the subject, that
many assaulted women are “uncooperative victims” in relation to the criminal
justice system’s processing of domestic violence cases.9 Some researchers
and, more prominently, many Crown attorneys, prosecutors, and judges
express frustration with women who refuse to participate in the prosecution of
domestic violence cases, recant while testifying, or otherwise impede the
criminal prosecution of domestic violence cases.10 But the idea that
“uncooperative victims” are part of the problem in legal responses to domestic
violence represents a failure to grasp the dynamics and impact of domestic
violence in women’s lives. Moreover, it rests on an undisturbed assumption
that the women who have experienced violence in their intimate relationships
should be invested in – and therefore “cooperate” with – the process of
criminalization, in support of the state’s pursuit of this strategy.
The category of the “uncooperative victim” differs from the “battered
woman syndrome” insofar as it is not an academically developed
psychological descriptor of the impact of violence but is, instead, a (negative)
characterization of a common response that some assaulted have to the
criminal justice system.11 Along with the “battered woman syndrome,”
however, the concept of the “uncooperative victim” in domestic violence cases
has gained currency and legitimacy in legal circles.12 However, both illustrate
an inadequate understanding of intimate violence and its effects on women’s
lives, particularly the effects associated with victimization and the social
conditions of inequality in which domestic violence takes place. To this
extent, each of these “victim” categories typifies the kind of “image problem”
that battered women face in law.13
Dominant images and legal representations of women who are victims of
violence typically fail to apprehend the co-existence of women’s victimization
with women’s agency that is often expressed through the context specific
strategies of resistance which most women employ when they experience
violence perpetrated against them.14 A consequence of this analytical severing
9. See Mills, supra note 4, at 589-90. See also Donna Wills, Domestic Violence: The Case
for Aggressive Prosecution, 7 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 173, 176-77 (1997).
10. Wills, supra note 9, at 178-79.
11. Accord id.
12. Id. at 176-79.
13. The idea that battered women have an “image problem” in law is developed by Martha
Mahoney in a seminal article on domestic violence. See Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of
Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1991).
14. Hanna, supra note 7, at 1882-85; Mills, supra note 4, at 583 n.175.
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of victimization from its co-existence with agency is a distorted understanding
both of the particular problem of violence in individual women’s lives and its
effects, as well as the broader social conditions in which this violence takes
shape and gets perpetuated. This, in turn, limits the efficacy of legal responses
to and interventions in domestic violence.
The two classes of victims I analyse in this paper, the essentially helpless
one with the syndrome and the overly active agent who is “uncooperative,” are
mirror-image and opposite examples of the difficulty incorporating
acknowledgement of both victimization and agency in representations of
women’s experiences of intimate violence. The “battered woman syndrome”
describes a woman’s utter helplessness in the face of ongoing abuse, e.g., her
incapacity is such that she cannot plan for her own safety, and she cannot
disentangle herself from her relationship with her abuser.15 She is a victim
whose agency has been obliterated by the abuse. The “uncooperative victim,”
on the other hand, is seen to have an excessive expression of agency.16 By
declining to participate or by not participating willingly and fully with the
prosecution of domestic violence cases, these “uncooperative” women are seen
to be non-compliant victims whose assertion of agency in opposition to the
needs of the criminal justice system undercuts their victim status and the
supportive response they warrant.17
A critical examination of both of these categories of victims – those
suffering from “battered woman syndrome” and those who are seen to be
“uncooperative” or “reluctant” witnesses – sheds light on the larger
complications which attach to legal images of assaulted women and the
paradoxes and limitations of contemporary legal responses to domestic
violence. These limitations, in turn, necessarily impede the development of
more adequate and nuanced accounts of the dynamics of domestic violence,
accounts which are able to grasp simultaneously the contours of women’s
victimization and the ways in which women negotiate, resist, and cope with
this violence in the contexts of their lives.
II. THE SOCIAL CONTEXT OF MEN’S VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
A.

Gender and Power

As has been demonstrated by a now significant body of research on the
topic, the majority of violence against women takes place in the context of
intimate heterosexual relationships, and among its more brutal manifestations,

15. See, e.g., Stark, supra note 1.
16. See Mills, supra note 4, at 589; Hanna, supra note 7, at 1883.
17. See Hanna, supra note 7, at 1885.
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includes repeated physical and sexual assaults.18 At the micro level, men’s
violence against women in intimate relationships expresses the greater social
power and control they wield; power which is also structured and entrenched at
the macro-level of social relations, in terms of their overrepresentation in most
positions of power and authority, including in the economic and political
spheres.
Gendered violence is a phenomenon that emerges from and reinforces
women’s subordinate status in society.19 This has been recognized by the
Supreme Court of Canada in cases including R. v. Seaboyer,20 Janzen v. Platy
Enterprises,21 and R. v. Osolin.22 As Justice L’Heureux-Dubé remarked in
Seaboyer, “perhaps more than any other crime, the fear and constant reality of
sexual assault affects how women conduct their lives and how they define their
relationship with the larger society.”23 In recent years there has been an
increasing awareness of the prevalence of violence against women, including
the specific problem of “woman abuse”24 in the context of spousal
relationships.25 It has now become an accepted part of much of the

18. Lori Haskell & Melanie Randall, Appendix A: The Women’s Safety Project, in
CANADIAN PANEL ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, CHANGING THE LANDSCAPE: ENDING
VIOLENCE – ACHIEVING EQUALITY app. A (1993); LORI HASKELL & MELANIE RANDALL,
PRIVATE VIOLENCE/PUBLIC FEAR: RETHINKING WOMEN’S OWN SAFETY (Solicitor General of
Canada ed., 1994); Melanie Randall & Lori Haskell, Sexual Violence in Women’s Lives: Findings
from the Women’s Safety Project, A Community Based Survey, 1 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 6,
24 (1995) [hereinafter Randall & Haskell, Sexual Violence]; STATISTICS CANADA, THE
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY (1993). In the research analysed in these studies the
perpetrators of the violence against women were overwhelmingly male.
19. Numerous research studies confirm the gender based nature of this violence. For
example, the Violence Against Women Survey conducted by Statistics Canada found that 39% of
women reported at least one incident of sexual assault by a man since the age of 16. Julian
Roberts, Criminal Justice Processing of Sexual Assault Cases, 14 JURISTAT 7 (1994). The
Women’s Safety Project found that 54% of respondents reported an experience of sexual assault
or attempted sexual assault at some point in their lives. Randall & Haskell, Sexual Violence,
supra note 18.
20. R v. Seaboyer, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577.
21. Janzen v. Platy Enterprises Ltd., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1252.
22. R. v. Osolin, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 595.
23. Seaboyer, [1991] 2 S.C.R. at 649 (L’Heureux-Dubé, J., dissenting in part).
24. I use this term to refer to what is perhaps more commonly recognized under the label
“wife assault.” In order to acknowledge the fact that this kind of violence takes place in a variety
of intimate heterosexual relationships, including marital and common law spousal relationships,
as well as “dating” relationships I prefer the descriptor “woman” to that of “wife.” In order to
capture the broad range of intrusive, controlling, and violent behaviours manifested in intimate
relationships I prefer the more expansive term “abuse” to that of “assault.”
25. Stark, supra note 1, at 977. Some of the earliest key works on the topic were American
and include: SUSAN SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE: THE VISIONS AND STRUGGLES
OF THE BATTERED WOMEN’S MOVEMENT (1982); LENORE A. WALKER, THE BATTERED
WOMAN (1979).
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mainstream discourse on violence against women, for example, that “power
and control” are central explanatory concepts in accounting for this violence.26
Yet the concepts “power and control” can nevertheless run the risk of
being understood in overly individualized terms if they are not linked to an
analysis of the social relations of gender, specifically of the ways in which this
violence expresses the imbalances of power embedded in those social relations
of inequality. By this I mean that it is possible to think that the men who
perpetrate violence against women are deviant individuals with an unhealthy
need for power and control, understood in terms of distortions in their personal
psyches. While attention to the factors which make some men act out violence
towards women while others do not is of crucial importance, the larger point I
am making here is that the problem of men’s violence against women is too
pervasive to be understood as a pathology of a few individual men. Instead, it
must be analysed within the context of the larger patterns of presumed male
entitlement, authority, and power constructed in the culture more broadly. The
rationalizations used by men who are “batterers” to explain, minimize, or
excuse their assaults on their female partners are most telling in this regard for
what they reveal about the larger constructs of traditional masculine norms.27
Studying the micropolitics of power, as these are expressed in individual and
intimate relationships between men and women, therefore, throws into stark
relief the larger patterns of gendered social inequalities and the way in which
these shape the conditions of women’s lives.
The pervasive social problem of violence against women, including sexual
assault, sexual harassment, and physical and sexual assault in intimate
relationships, exists on an international scale28 and cannot be understood apart
from the hierarchical and unequal relations of gender in which it is both
situated and of which it is a product. Put differently, violence against women
simultaneously expresses and reproduces sexual inequality on both individual
and societal levels; it is both a cause and effect of sex inequality.

26. See generally CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE
STATE (1989); DIANA E. H. RUSSELL, RAPE IN MARRIAGE (1982); LIZ KELLY, SURVIVING
SEXUAL VIOLENCE (1988); SCHECTER, supra note 25; ELIZABETH A. STANKO, INTIMATE
INTRUSIONS: WOMEN’S EXPERIENCES OF MALE VIOLENCE (1985); Mahoney, supra note 13.
27. See generally R. EMERSON DOBASH ET AL., CHANGING VIOLENT MEN (2000); James
Ptack, Why Do Men Batter Their Wives?, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON WIFE ABUSE 133
(Kersti Yllo & Michele Bograd eds., 1988).
28. See, e.g., AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, BROKEN BODIES, SHATTERED MINDS: THE
TORTURE AND ILL-TREATMENT OF WOMEN 2 (2001), available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/
eng-373; U.N. CENTRE FOR SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS, VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN IN THE FAMILY 3-4 (1989); CANADA AND THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL
ASSEMBLY, SPECIAL SESSIONS: WOMEN AND VIOLENCE, STATUS OF WOMEN CANADA,: BEIJING
+5:
FACTSHEETS
(June
2002)
at
http://www.swc-cfc.gc.ca/pubs/b5_factsheets/
b5_factsheets_13_e.html.
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The Prevalence and Characteristics of Abuse in Intimate Heterosexual
Relationships

Research has consistently demonstrated that approximately one in four
women has experienced some kind of physical violence or physical assault in
an intimate relationship with a male partner.29 As these studies document,
violence against women in intimate relationships can take a variety of forms.30
It can include kicks, slaps, shoving, use of weapons, death threats, repeated
punching and beating, the infliction of burns, damage to the woman’s
possessions, threats of harm against her, her friends, and her family, sexual
assault, and a variety of other abusive behaviours.31 Far too often the
specifically sexual violence, including rape, used by men against their female
intimates, is an ignored component of violence against women in spousal
relationships because it remains even more privatized and stigmatized than
physical assaults.32
Some women assaulted by their male intimates are subjected to prolonged
and brutal beatings with great frequency; others have only been hit or assaulted
a single time.33 Yet the effects of this kind of violence cannot be measured
only in relation to variables like the frequency or severity of assault. Instead,
the way the violence operates as part of a larger pattern of coercion, control,
and domination in the relationship must be taken into account, along, most
importantly, with a woman’s subjective experience of this violence in order to
appreciate for any individual woman what impact the violence has on her and
the meaning she makes of it.34 As Lori Haskell has pointed out, a woman may
only have been assaulted once in order to “learn” that she must thoroughly
accommodate and adapt herself to the controlling tactics of her male partner to
avoid further abuse.35
29. Randall & Haskell, Sexual Violence, supra note 18, at 24. For example, the Women’s
Safety Project reports that 27% of women interviewed disclosed physical assault by a male
intimate. Id. Similarly, the original large scale Statistics Canada survey on women’s experiences
of violence in adulthood, found that virtually the same proportion of women respondents, one in
four (or 25%) reported at least one experience of physical assault perpetrated by a male intimate.
STATISTICS CANADA, supra note 18.
30. See U.N. CENTRE FOR SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS, supra
note 28, at 21.
31. See id. at 21-23.
32. See, e.g., DAVID FINKELHOR & KERSTI YLLO, LICENSE TO RAPE: SEXUAL ABUSE OF
WIVES 84-87 (1985); RUSSELL, supra note 26, at 1-5.
33. See SCHECTER, supra note 25, at 222-23.
34. See U.N. CENTRE FOR SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS, supra
note 28, at 21-22; Isabel Marcus, Reframing “Domestic Violence”: Terrorism in the Home, in
THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE: THE DISCOVERY OF DOMESTIC ABUSE 32 (Martha
Albertson Fineman & Roxanne Mykitiuk eds., 1994); SCHECHTER, supra note 25, at 222.
35. Lori Haskell, Remarks at Interviewer Training, Women’s Safety Project Research (1991)
(remarks on file with author).
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The idea of “intimate partner terrorism” as a way of conceptualizing
violence against women in intimate relationships has gained prominence.36
Other scholars have compared the unsettling effects of violence in intimate
relationships with the kind of destabilization of entire communities which
results from acts of political terrorism. As Isabel Marcus sees it,
[T]here are strong and striking parallels and similarities between terrorism as a
strategy used to destabilize a community or society consisting of both women
and men, and the abuse and violence perpetrated against women [by men] in
intimate or partnering situations.37

Marcus’s analogy draws the parallel between the disempowering and
terrifying aspects and effects of political terrorism against specific
communities and the sexual terrorism to which significant numbers of
individual women are subjected in their intimate relationships with men.38
This analogy, while powerful, should not eclipse attention to the fact that the
compared contexts also differ in highly significant ways. Whereas acts of
political terrorism typically take place in a context of declared war or at least
overt hostilities between (relatively) clearly defined and identified political
groups, men’s acts of sexual violence against women in intimate relationships
take place in contexts which are, to the contrary, supposed to be characterized
by affective emotional ties, partnership, allegiance, trust, loyalty, and safety.39
This, at least, is what is promised by the dominant discourses surrounding
heterosexual marriage and “romantic love.”40 To this extent, acts of sexual and
physical violence against women in their intimate relationships are striking
36. See, e.g., Michael Johnson, Patriarchical Terrorism and Common Couple Violence: Two
Forms of Violence Against Women, 57 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 283, 283 (1995); Marcus, supra note
34, at 30-32.
37. Marcus, supra note 34, at 32. Marcus elaborates upon this analogy in the following
terms:
Like terror directed at a community, violence against women is designed to maintain
domination and control, to enhance or reinforce advantages, and to defend privileges.
Like other individuals or communities who experience politically motivated terrorism,
women whose partnering and intimate relationships are marked by violence directed
against them live in a world similarly punctuated by traumatic and/or catastrophic events,
such as threats and humiliation, stalking and surveillance, coercion and physical violence.
Within a family structure, women are likely to be the targets of violence, and men are
likely to be the perpetrators. Whether the violence is identified as the imposition of
discipline, as a strategy of family governance, or as an act of masculinity, the
consequences are the same. Women learn that they can be kept in their culturally and
socially designated “place” by the threat or imposition of physical injury.
Id.
38. Id.
39. See id. at 12; Martha R. Mahoney, Victimization or Oppression? Women’s Lives,
Violence, and Agency, in THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE: THE DISCOVERY OF
DOMESTIC ABUSE, supra note 34, at 60.
40. See Mahoney, supra note 39, at 32; Marcus, supra note 34, at 32.
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aberrations from what the norm is supposed to be and could be understood as a
form of “undeclared” intimate warfare.41 This unnamed and isolating character
of violence in intimate relationships makes the experience not only deeply
traumatizing, but also deeply confusing for those women who find themselves
in the position of trying to reconcile the violence perpetrated against them by
the same person from whom they are supposed to receive love and, according
to traditional gender scripts, “protection.”42
III. LEGAL IMAGES43 OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN:
CONCEPTUAL PROBLEMS AND POLITICAL CHALLENGES
REGARDING THE “BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME”
A.

Recognition of the “Battered Woman Syndrome” in Canadian Law: The
Lavallée Decision44
The reasonable man’s claims to universality are under siege. The contest
comes from those whose experiences are other than his. The problem for them
is how to effect a point of entry into the legal discourse of common sense and
reasonableness. That discourse, taken as belonging to everyone, is exclusive to
those with power over knowledge. So the problem is epistemological: how to
alter ways of seeing, understanding and defining the normalcy of the
reasonable man.45

In Canada, it was R. v. Lavallée which provided a legal basis upon which
to interject gender into the analysis of reasonableness brought to bear on
criminal liability in cases of homicide perpetrated by “battered women.”46
Specifically, the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Lavallée is famous for
entrenching legal recognition of the evidentiary support provided through the
“battered woman syndrome” to a woman’s self-defence claim in a criminal
trial in which she stood accused of killing her violent male partner.47

41. Marcus, supra note 34, at 32.
42. Accord Mahoney, supra note 39, at 60; SCHECTER, supra note 25, at 222-24.
43. Mahoney, supra note 13, at 1-3 (using this descriptor to refer to the image of women,
particularly battered women, created by the publicized courtroom trials in domestic violence
cases).
44. R. v. Lavallée, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 852.
45. Katherine O’Donovan, Law’s Knowledge: The Judge, the Expert, The Battered Woman,
and Her Syndrome, 20 J.L. & SOC’Y. 427, 429 (1993).
46. Lavallée, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 852.
47. Id. It is important to note that “battered woman syndrome” is not itself a defence to a
criminal charge. Instead, it is a psychological explanatory framework, introduced through expert
evidence, through which a woman’s self defence claims can be evaluated in light of her previous
experiences of violence. Id.
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The defence of self-defence has been often used in Canada in the relatively
few cases of spousal homicide perpetrated by women.48 In Canadian law, as in
most other jurisdictions, legal crime categories and defences differentiate
between types of killings to distinguish those considered the most heinous,
such as homicides which are “planned and deliberate” for example from those
which take place under a range of other circumstances.49 In order to recognize
the external exigencies and human “infirmities” which may contribute to or
cause a killing, the law recognizes a number of defences to the crime of
murder.50 If successful, a self-defence claim excuses the offender from legal
liability for the killing.51 However, in cases of spousal homicide, this defence
has not easily fit with dominant social perceptions of the kinds of
circumstances in which this crime often takes place.52 As Mewett and
Manning remark, “defences carry with them, by necessary implication, the
problem of the social acceptability of the parameters of such defences.”53 In
terms of the self-defence claims of women who kill their violent male partners,
the traditional model of the sudden bar room brawl which erupts between two
men who engage in physical combat that ends in the death of one of them, is
neither an appropriate nor a relevant analogy.
The Canadian Criminal Code contains several provisions relevant to the
defence of self-defence. Section 34(1) refers to killings in self-defence which
were carried out unintentionally.54 The legal challenge in charges laid under
this section lies in determining when an unintentional killing is justified and by
what standard the determination is made, whether it be according to what the
objective so-called “reasonable” person in the situation would assess or
according to the subjective appraisal of the accused.55 In cases of spousal
homicide where battered women who have endured prolonged victimization

48. Alison Young, Conjugal Homicide and Legal Violence: A Comparative Analysis, 31
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 761, 781 (1993). “[T]here has been no case in English criminal law where a
battered woman has successfully pleaded that the homicide of her abuser was in her selfdefence.” Id.
49. Martin’s Criminal Code, §§ 219-36; §§ 34-37 (2001) (Can.).
50. Martin’s Criminal Code, §§ 34-37 (2001) (Can.).
51. Lavallée, [1990] 1 S.C.R. at 852; R. v. Kandola, [1993] 27 B.C.A.C. 226.
52. See Elizabeth Sheehy, Battered Women and Mandatory Minimum Sentences, 39
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 529, 532-34 (2001). See also Brenda M. Baker, Provocation as a Defense
for Abused Women Who Kill, 11 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 193, 195 (1998).
53. MEWETT AND MANNING, CRIMINAL LAW 746 (3d ed. 1994).
54. The section reads: “Everyone who is unlawfully assaulted without having provoked the
assault is justified in repelling force by force if the force he uses is not intended to cause death or
grievous bodily harm and is no more than is necessary to defend himself.” Martin’s Criminal
Code, § 34(1) (2001) (Can.).
55. See generally R. v. Cinous, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 3; R. v. Hibbert, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 973; David
M. Paciocco, Subjective and Objective Standards of Fault for Offenses and Defenses, 59 SASK L.
REV. 271, 306-07 (1995).
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kill their abusers, this question is of critical importance because the “ordinary”
person’s perceptions of the actual incident or circumstances surrounding the
killing may fail to grasp the context and the psychological effects of prolonged
physical brutalization, the fear of further (often explicitly threatened) violence
or death, and the perceived (and often very real) lack of options a battered
woman may actually have in terms of protecting herself from her partner’s
violence.
Section 34(2) of the Criminal Code also deals with cases in which the
accused killed in self-defence and specifies the extent of justification for this.56
As Grant et al. point out, the Supreme Court of Canada decision in R. v.
Lavallée, which was informed by the analysis offered in the expert testimony
relating to “battered woman syndrome,” has particularly had far reaching
implications for Section 34(2).57 The Lavallée decision has wide ranging legal
repercussions for what it means to be “unlawfully assaulted,” the requirement
that the accused exercised self-defence in response to an “imminent attack,”
the common law “duty to retreat,” and the interpretation of “reasonableness” in
cases of domestic violence.
For example, at common law, the “assault” referred to in Section 34(2)
from which the accused defends him or herself had been interpreted narrowly
to exclude verbal threats to kill.58 However, this kind of narrow reading,
which failed to grasp the nature of the often repeated threats made against a
battered woman as part of the violence perpetrated against her, was overturned
by Lavallée.59 In delivering the majority judgment for the Court, Justice
Wilson clarified that “s. 34(2)(a) does not actually stipulate that the accused
apprehend imminent danger when he or she acts” and further asserted that it is
case law which has “read that requirement into the defence.”60 Justice Wilson

56. The section reads:
Every one who is unlawfully assaulted and who causes death or grievous bodily harm in
repelling the assault is justified if
(a) he causes it under reasonable apprehension of death or grievous bodily harm from
the violence with which the assault was originally made or with which the assailant
pursues his purposes; and
(b) he believes, on reasonable grounds, that he cannot otherwise preserve himself
from death or grievous bodily harm.
Martin’s Criminal Code, § 34(2) (2001) (Can.).
57. Martin’s Criminal Code, § 34(2) (2001) (Can.); R. v. Lavallée, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 852;
Isabel Grants et al., A Forum on Lavallée v. R.: Women and Self Defense, 25 U.B.C. 23 (1991);
Martha Shaffer, The Battered Woman Syndrome Revisited: Some Complicating Thoughts Years
after R. v. Lavallée, 47 U. TORONTO L.J. 1, 1, 6 (1997).
58. See, e.g., Lavallée, [1990] 1 S.C.R. at 852; R. v. Reilly, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 396; R. v.
Bogue, [1976] 70 D.L.R. 603; R. Whynot, [1983] 61 N.S.R. 33.
59. See generally Lavallée, [1990] 1 S.C.R. at 852.
60. Id. at 872-73.
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criticized the narrow interpretation of assault in Whynot, in the following
terms:
The requirement imposed in Whynot that a battered woman wait until the
physical assault is underway before her apprehension can be validated by law
would, in the words of an American court, be tantamount to sentencing her to
“murder by installment.”61

This more expansive view of self-defence in Canadian jurisprudence is also
evident in R. v. Whitten.62 In this decision, Chief Justice Glube referred to the
evidence that the accused, a battered woman, was at the point she killed her
husband “fending off an attack from him, albeit basically a verbal attack at the
time, but which I have no doubt in the past led to physical attacks on upon
her.”63
In addition to excising the “imminent attack” requirement, the Lavallée
judgment is significant for undermining the idea that the “duty to retreat”
means that a battered woman who kills is deprived of the defence of selfdefence because she should have left her home. The Court clarified that:
[T]raditional self-defence doctrine does not require a person to retreat from her
home instead of defending herself . . . . A man’s home may be his castle but it
is also the woman’s home even if it seems to her more like a prison in the
circumstances.64

Perhaps most significant in Lavallée, however, is the Supreme Court of
Canada’s acceptance of the evidentiary support of battered woman syndrome
in the self-defence claims made by the accused.65 This expert testimony was
crucial in allowing for a new interpretation of “reasonableness” from the
viewpoint of the battered woman who kills because she sees no other option
and/or because she is protecting her own life. As Justice Wilson elaborated:
If it strains credulity to imagine what the “ordinary man” would do in the
position of a battered spouse, it is probably because men do not typically find
themselves in that situation. Some women do, however. The definition of
what is reasonable must be adapted to circumstances which are, by and large,
foreign to the world inhabited by the hypothetical “reasonable man.”66

In this way, the Lavallée decision can be read as explicitly introducing gender
into the “reasonable person” standard and as insisting upon a more contextual
reading of what “reasonable” means from the particular life circumstances of
the accused, when she is a woman who has been subjected to prolonged and
ongoing violence and kills to save herself from this violence.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 853.
R. v. Whitten, [1992] 110 N.S.R.2d 149, at 157.
Id.
Accord Lavallée, [1990] 1 S.C.R. at 856-57.
Id.
Id.
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When women kill their spouses it is most often in the context of a
relationship already characterized by extreme and/or repeated episodes of
violence. The killing usually takes place when the woman’s strategies of
resistance and/or other avenues of escape have failed to protect her from
further violence. The Supreme Court of Canada’s holding in Lavallée reflects
a judicial decision significantly more sensitized to the social and individual
circumstances in which some “battered women” kill to save their own lives
and more sensitized to the desperation and fear which usually flow from living
with ongoing violence and being threatened with death. By removing the
common law restrictions that had made self-defence virtually unavailable to
battered women who kill, Lavallée offers a contextualized and gender sensitive
reading of self-defence in relation to murder charges and an expanded legal
understanding of the circumstances surrounding this particular form of spousal
homicide. To this extent, this decision represents a significant, if not
unequivocal, step forward.
B.

The Battered Woman Syndrome and the “Cycle of Violence”

Since its relatively recent acceptance in U.S. and Canadian case law,
commentators from a variety of fields have expressed concern about the
politically problematic aspects of the “battered woman syndrome.”67 Some
have recommended ways of reconceptualizing this “syndrome” in order to
avoid its most obvious limitations,68 while others have described it as a “red
herring” and called for its elimination in the legal arena altogether.69 The
trajectory of the “battered woman syndrome” and its reception in academic and
legal circles cannot be traced without reference to the work of its originator,
Lenore Walker, and her first articulation of the syndrome two decades ago.70

67. Shaffer, supra note 57, at 1.
68. See, e.g., Mary Ann Dutton, Understanding Women’s Responses to Domestic Violence:
A Redefinition of Battered Woman Syndrome, 21 HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW 1191, 1193 (1993);
Joan S. Meier, Notes from the Underground: Integrating Psychological and Legal Perspectives
on Domestic Violence in Theory and Practice, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1295, 1314 (1993); Shaffer,
supra note 57, at 8-9; Stark, supra note 1, at 1009-11.
69. See, e.g., DONALD DOWNS, MORE THAN VICTIMS: BATTERED WOMEN, THE SYNDROME
SOCIETY AND THE LAW 223 (1996); Julianne Parfett, Beyond Battered Woman Syndrome
Evidence: An Alternative Approach to the Use of Abuse Evidence in Spousal Homicide Cases, 12
WINDSOR REV. LEGAL & SOCIAL ISSUES 55, 96 (2001).
70. The identification and popularization of the category “battered woman” was most clearly
and explicitly formulated in Walker’s widely cited and influential book, entitled The Battered
Woman. See generally WALKER, supra note 25. This text has been regarded as a classic in the
field, along with her subsequent books and many articles. See, e.g., LENORE E. WALKER,
TERRIFYING LOVE: WHY BATTERED WOMEN KILL AND HOW SOCIETY RESPONDS (1989)
[hereinafter WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE]; LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN’S
SYNDROME (1984) [hereinafter WALKER, BATTERED WOMAN’S SYNDROME].
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Central to Walker’s explanatory account of the “battered woman
syndrome” are the related concepts of “learned helplessness” and the “cycle of
violence.”71 In Walker’s view, “learned helplessness” is a constitutive
component of the “battered woman syndrome.”72 Walker’s original
formulation of the “battered woman syndrome” drew on the work of Martin
Seligman and a team of researchers who conducted research with animals to
measure the behavioural effects of electric shocks administered to them while
in captivity.73 Based on his laboratory studies of dogs, Seligman postulated the
theory of “learned helplessness” to explain their response to abusive stimuli
over which they could not exercise any control.74 As a result of the shocks, the
dogs became listless, complacent, and passive and made no effort to escape
their cages even when it was possible for them to do so.75 Walker saw this
situation as parallel to that experienced by “battered women,” who, unable to
Walker provided one of the earliest feminist accounts of the experiences of women
abused by their male intimate partners. Her research on, and analyses of woman abuse, including
her articulation of the “battered woman syndrome,” contain both elements of radicalism in their
original conception, as well as the conservative and stereotypical elements which remain so
troubling today. For example, in her first book on the topic of woman battering, Walker outlines
the various dimensions of this kind of abuse, including attention to women’s experiences of both
physical and sexual assaults, economic deprivation, and social isolation imposed by their male
partners. In this way, Walker presents an expansive view of the features of violence against
women in intimate relationships and identifies the ways in which violent men not only use
physical assaults against the women with whom they live but also seek to exercise control over
their female partners in a variety of other spheres. Walker also explicitly identifies sexual
subordination as the cause and context of domestic violence. As she puts it, only where there is
true equality between males and females can there be a society that is free from violence.
WALKER, supra note 25, at x. Writing over twenty years ago, Walker explicitly situated the
problem of men’s violence against women in intimate relationships within the larger social
relations of gender inequality.
In spite of these progressive and more contextualized aspects of her analysis, Walker
nevertheless describes her research as aimed at studying “battered women’s problems” and as
intended to illuminate the specific “psychology of battered women as victims.” Id. To this end,
the explanatory model of the “battered woman’s syndrome” she developed to explore the special
psychology of “battered women” has now become a dominant way of understanding the effects of
this kind of violence in women’s lives. In this way, then, Walker’s work ultimately ends up
reinforcing a focus on the “psychology of victims” in ascribing to “battered women” a distinct
psychological profile which seems ultimately to attach to the women themselves instead of being
understood as a normal response to abnormal external circumstances. Although it is arguably an
inadvertent consequence of her research, Walker’s work – and the way it has been taken up since
it first appeared – has significantly contributed to pathologizing and psychologizing of the lives of
women who are assaulted by their male intimates.
71. See WALKER, supra note 25, at 42-70.
72. Id. at 47.
73. Id. at 45-46.
74. Martin E.P. Seligman et al., Alleviation of Learned Helplessness in the Dog, 73 J.
ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 256, 258 (1968).
75. Id. at 256.
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control or stop the violence perpetrated against them, “learned” to become
“helpless” in the face of it.76 This concept is a foundational component of the
“battered woman syndrome.”77
The concept of “learned helplessness” is one of the fundamental flaws
which construct the problems associated with the “battered woman syndrome.”
The focus on a battered woman’s so-called “helplessness,” whether learned or
not, not only over generalizes by stereotyping the experiences of women who
experience violence in their intimate relationships, but it also reveals a deeper
problem. Most fundamentally, it focuses the lens on the individual woman’s
perceived inability to react more effectively to her difficult circumstances and
loses sight of two typically co-existing, more significant and determinative
phenomena (as I elaborate more fully below). These are, first and foremost,
the fact that most battered women are not helpless but are, in fact, actively
engaged in a pursuing a variety of coping, help-seeking, and resistance
strategies.78 Second, the “learned helplessness” model entirely overlooks the
myriad ways in which the social conditions of inequality so often limit or
thwart battered women’s help-seeking strategies.
According to Walker, there is also a “cycle of violence” which
characterizes violence against women in their intimate relationships with
men.79 This cycle comprises three distinct phases: the tension building phase
prior to an assault, the eruption of violence, and the period of contrition which
typically follows, sometimes referred to as the “honeymoon” period.80 Yet the
notion that violence in intimate relationships follows such a discernible pattern
is a rather formulaic, and even static representation. Despite the fact that it is
predicated on a view of the cyclical nature of violence, it overemphasizes the
“violent event” itself, by defining all of the phases of the cycle in relation to
the “violent episode.”81 In this way, the dynamic and ongoing ways in which
violent and abusive men exercise control, domination, and coercion over their
female partners are obscured in favour of overplaying the significance of the
actual and discrete “incidents” of physical assault.82 But for a woman living
with a violent male partner, there may never be a period she experiences as a
“honeymoon” phase, as the absence of physical assault does not eradicate its
ongoing consequences, including the woman’s need for hypervigilance in

76. See WALKER, supra note 25, at 48.
77. Id. at 47.
78. See, e.g., EDWARD GONDOLF & ELLEN FISHER, BATTERED WOMEN AS SURVIVORS: AN
ALTERNATIVE TO LEARNED HELPLESSNESS (1988).
79. Id. at 55.
80. Id. at 56-70.
81. Id. at 59-69.
82. This is in no way to suggest that physical assaults are not highly significant and
destructive events; rather, that physical violence is typically only one expression of a larger and
often more insidious pattern of domination and control.
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guarding against/watching for “the next time” and the ways in which the
domination is sedimented through multiple layers of everyday behaviours and
areas through which his control is assumed and exerted.83 In this way, the very
notion of a “cycle of violence” strips away the complex, ongoing, and
relational dimensions of the patterns of male control and domination of which
the man’s violence is only a part.
Evan Stark makes a similar point when he observes that:
[W]ork with battered women . . . suggests that physical violence may not be
the most significant factor about most battering relationships. In all
probability, the clinical profile revealed by battered women reflects the fact
that they have been subjected to an ongoing strategy of intimidation, isolation
and control that extends to all areas of a woman’s life, including sexuality;
material necessities; relations with family, children, and friends; and work.84

Findings from the Women’s Safety Project research confirm precisely this
point, that in women’s own subjective experience an episode of violence
perpetrated by their male intimate partner can impose severe limitations on
diverse areas of their lives.85
The more generalized patterns of control and subordination which
underpin intimate violence, therefore, can be seen in the many areas in which
assaulted women report feeling deeply constrained, limited, and restricted in
their everyday lives.86 To this extent, the “cycle of violence” postulated by
Walker misses the ongoing relational aspects of women’s subordination in
their relationships with violent male partners, as well as the patterns of
domination and subordination which do not evaporate in any so-called
“honeymoon phase” and which extend beyond the immediate consequences of
men’s discrete acts of violence to powerfully restrain women’s freedom and
autonomy.

83. See WALKER, supra note 25, at 48.
84. Stark, supra note 1, at 986.
85. For example, a majority of the women interviewed for that study who disclosed an
experience of physical assault in an intimate relationship with a man reported that as a result of
the violence they felt unable to express any criticisms of their partners, ask for his participation in
child care responsibilities, or have control over their own money. More specifically, in 53% of
the cases in which women reported physical assault in an intimate relationship they also reported
that they felt unable to disagree with their partner. In 42% of these cases women reported being
unable to spend time apart from their male partners, and 25% reported that they could not wear
the clothes they wanted to. Perhaps most telling and most disturbing is that in 40% of cases of
physical assault in intimate relationships the women interviewed reported that they did not feel
able to refuse unwanted sex, suggesting that they may have often accommodated unwanted sex
with their abusive partners in order to avoid further conflict and/or physical assault. See Lori
Haskell & Melanie Randall, Politics of Women’s Safety: Sexual Violence, Women’s Fear and the
Public/Private Split, 26 RESOURCES FEMINIST RES. 113, 141-42 (1999).
86. Id. at 142.
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C. Dysfunction, Deficits, and Other Pathologies: The Battered Woman and
Her “Syndrome”87
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the “battered woman syndrome” is the
way it calls up and underlines the popular image of a woman who has been
subjected to violence as a helpless and utter “victim” and as one who has been
rendered totally passive and ineffective as a result of this violence. This image
of the “battered women” has now been firmly inscribed in legal discourse
surrounding “battered women” who kill, given the way in which expert
evidence on the syndrome presented at trial is so often given and/or received.88
Martha Shaffer’s review of Canadian case law since Lavallée, in which
battered woman syndrome has supported a self-defence claim for a woman
accused of killing her violent spouse, indicates that the image of the helpless
battered woman is potentially tied to the even more dangerous stereotype of
the “authentic” and “deserving” battered woman.89 Those “battered women”
who fail to conform to this stereotype of incapacity, because they are seen as
angry, aggressive, or “tough,” may fail to have a jury or judge understand the
applicability of the doctrine of self-defence and the Lavallée expansion of
“reasonableness” to their defence claims.90
This tendency towards stereotyping of women’s experiences that inheres in
the syndrome has been soundly criticized by a variety of scholars. For
example, in Evan Stark’s view, the “battered woman syndrome” provides an
“inaccurate, reductionist and potentially demeaning representation of woman
battering”91 insofar as it “emphasizes the disabling effects of violence rather
than women’s survival skills.”92 For Mary Dutton, a clinical psychologist, one
of the major shortcomings of “battered woman syndrome” is that it is taken to
represent the psychology of all battered women when, in her view, “battered
women’s diverse psychological realities are not limited to one particular
‘profile’.”93 Further, according to Martha Shaffer, the “battered woman
syndrome” represents battered women as “dysfunctional” and therefore as
incapable of autonomy or rationality in their actions.94
These critiques are well founded for the emphasis on the psychological
incapacitation of “battered women” is not accidental but is absolutely central to
the definition of the syndrome itself. Walker, in fact, is explicit in expressing
her view that battering produces the state of “learned helplessness” in women

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

See O’Donovan, supra note 45, at 427.
See generally Shaffer, supra note 57; see also Mahoney, supra note 13, at 24-33.
Shaffer, supra note 57, at 25.
Id. at 30-32.
Stark, supra note 1, at 975.
Id. at 1000.
Dutton, supra note 68, at 1195.
Shaffer, supra note 57, at 19.
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and that the psychological effects of battering result in a form of psychological
impairment, a diminished capacity in terms of the woman’s emotions,
cognitions, and behaviour.95 As she explains in her book Terrifying Love: Why
Battered Women Kill and How Society Responds, “the process of learned
helplessness results in a state with deficits in three specific areas: in the area
where battered women think, in how they feel, and in the way they behave.”96
There is no subtlety or ambiguity in this formulation. Walker is explicit that
the psychological consequences of battering are such that the woman becomes
psychically “damaged” and, by obvious inference, cannot make the kinds of
decisions she would or should make if she were not suffering from the
“syndrome.”97 To this extent, then, the “battered woman syndrome” is
arguably little more than a more compassionate and gender sensitive version of
the traditional psychiatric view of women as “irrational” or even “insane,”98
except that this version incorporates a recognition that the women’s alleged
“irrationality” or psychological incapacity results from the infliction of abuse
upon her by a male intimate. In other words, the abuse is seen to be wrong and
not the woman’s fault in the “battered woman syndrome,” but it is also seen to
have made her lack autonomy and rationality.
D. Making Women’s Resistance Visible
Both of the formulations – “learned helplessness” and “battered women’s
syndrome” – emphasize passivity and powerlessness at the expense of
recognizing women’s struggles and resilience in the face of the conditions of
their subordination, of which the violence forms only a part. Moreover, they
entirely obliterate the varied and complex strategies of resistance that most
women who experience violence actually devise and carry out.99
Research with women assaulted by their male partners has consistently
demonstrated that women employ a range of creative ways through which they
attempt to escape, avoid, minimize, or stop the violence against them.100 In the
Women’s Safety Project study, for example, the majority of the 420 women

95. WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE, supra note 70, at 50-51.
96. Id. at 36 (emphasis added).
97. See generally id. at 42-53.
98. See ANN JONES, WOMEN WHO KILL 158-66, 288-89 (1980) (presenting an analysis of
the courts’ historical predilection for accepting pleas of insanity in cases of women who killed
their violent male spouses over explanations which address the dynamics of the violence and the
woman’s lack of options).
99. See Melanie Randall, Agency and (In)Subordination: Victimization, Resistance and
Sexual Violence in Women’s Lives (1996) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, York University) (on
file with author) (analysing women’s resistance strategies in the context of violence).
100. See, e.g., MARY ANN DUTTON, EMPOWERING AND HEALING THE BATTERED WOMAN: A
MODEL FOR ASSESSMENT AND INTERVENTION 41-43 (1992); GONDOLF & FISHER, supra note 78,
at 28.
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randomly surveyed reported using a variety of resistance strategies in relation
to experiences of sexual violence.101 Specifically, in 64% of the (134) cases of
physical assault perpetrated by a male intimate, women expressed some form
of resistance, as they did in 70.6% of the cases of sexual assault.102 Even in
terms of responding to experiences of sexual abuse and incest in childhood, in
68.8% of these (339) cases women reported that they mounted some kind of
resistance.103
The problem is that the social conditions of inequality often impose severe
limitations on the options which are actually available to women, including a
lack of second stage housing, sex segregation and unequal pay in the labour
market, a lack of available and affordable child care facilities, the social,
ideological, and economic pressures to “keep the family together,” and the
stigmatizing and victim-blaming attitudes which still prevail and which often
hold women accountable for the violence perpetrated against them.104 For
women from racialized groups, immigrant, or refugee women, these conditions
are often exacerbated by the relations of racism and the fact that membership
in a racial “minority” group and lower socio-economic status are often coterminus.105 These conditions of inequality, therefore, seriously constrain the
extent to which women can exercise “choice” and autonomy and the extent to
which they are able to resist the violence perpetrated against them. Yet in spite
of these conditions, what is remarkable is that so many women still find
creative and effective ways to resist violence and abuse.
In legal terms, instead of widening the lens through which women’s
experiences of violence are understood, the “battered woman syndrome” may
ultimately replace one set of narrow stereotypes for another. This is because
the use of “battered woman syndrome” as evidentiary support for a selfdefence claim made by a woman who has killed her violent spouse “furthers a
trend away from justification defenses for women defendants” by resting on an
account of psychological incapacity. 106 It does this by answering the “why
didn’t she leave?” question with a psychological account of the battered
woman’s helplessness which results from her exposure to prolonged violence.
As Donald Downs observes, “battered woman syndrome speaks the language
of justification and situational excuse, [but] is at heart a defense based on

101. See Randall, supra note 99, at 148 (discussing these results).
102. Id. These figures exclude cases of sexual assault which also took place in the context of
a relationship where the woman was also physically battered as these were included in the data
set which documents physical assault in intimate relationships. These figures also refer only to
the more “extreme” and narrowly defined cases of sexual violence, documented on the miniquestionnaires. Id.
103. Id.
104. See Dutton, supra note 68, at 1232-40; WALKER, supra note 25, at 14-15.
105. Accord Dutton, supra note 68, at 1236-38.
106. DOWNS, supra note 69, at 226.
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incapacity excuses.”107 In this way the image of the helpless, passive, and
debilitated “battered woman” plays into pre-existing social and legal
stereotypes about women’s diminished capacities.
E.

Misapplications of the “Battered Woman Syndrome” in Law
Battered woman syndrome is, among other things, a tool by which legal
authorities, including juries, can bend or tailor stringent legal rules to achieve
justice in individual cases.108
The battered woman syndrome was a watershed in social and legal
understandings of domestic violence.109

The acceptance of the “battered woman syndrome” by the Supreme Court
of Canada in Lavallée and its use in the Canadian legal system since that
decision have not amounted to an unambiguous or unequivocal advance in the
law’s response in Canada to the problem of violence against women in
intimate relationships generally or in supporting the defence of self-defence for
women accused of killing their violent male partners specifically.110 Even
aside from its inherent limitations, in terms of achieving relief for individual
women who have experienced extreme violence and killed in self-defence, the
evidentiary support provided by the battered woman syndrome has made little
difference.
In 1995, the Minister of Justice and the Solicitor General of Canada
established a Self-Defence Review, headed by Judge Lynn Ratushny, to reexamine convictions of women in light of the Supreme Court of Canada’s
finding in Lavallée.111 The Review’s final report, released in 1997,
recommended some kind of relief for only seven of the ninety-eight cases
considered and did not result in the release of a single woman from jail, an
outcome one commentator has described as “disturbing.”112
Critically reviewing this review, Elizabeth Sheehy remarks that “feminist
activists and lawyers will have to work to generate systematic changes out of
the [Self-Defence Review].”113 Additionally, based on a separate empirical
analysis of the impact of Lavallée in the five years following the judgment,

107. Id. Downs is actually somewhat inaccurate in his language here because “battered
woman syndrome” is not itself a defence but simply lends support to a defence of self-defence
through the admission of expert testimony.
108. Id. at 115.
109. Meier, supra note 68, at 1305.
110. See infra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
111. Gary Trotter, Justice Politics and the Royal Prerogative of Mercy: Examining the SelfDefence Review, 26 QUEEN’S L.J. 339, 340-41 (2001).
112. See id. at 341-42; see also Elizabeth Sheehy, Review of Self-Defence Review, 12 CAN. J.
WOMEN & L. 197, 198 (1999).
113. Sheehy, supra note 112, at 198-99.
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Martha Shaffer argues that the decision “does not appear to have led to a
dramatic increase in successful self-defence claims by women.”114 Ironically,
then, the “battered woman syndrome” has not had an especially major impact
in case law, in Canada at least, certainly not in proportion to the ink which has
been spilled in analysing its legal significance.115
The battered woman syndrome, however, has appeared in some legal cases
in Canada and elsewhere in surprising and potentially quite troubling ways.
For example, in the United States, Dr. Lenore Walker, who, because of her
research and writing in the field is considered to be a leading expert on the
condition, was scheduled and publicly announced as an expert witness for the
defence in the trial of O.J. Simpson.116 Her testimony was solicited by the
defence in order to bolster the claim that the accused’s history of battering his
wife did not predict that he was a murderer.117 Whether or not this is true is
less relevant than the fact that a psychological construct developed to describe
the experiences and psychological profile of women subjected to ongoing
violence from their husbands was now being used as a predictor for whether or
not men were likely to kill the women they assaulted.118 Not only is the
“battered woman syndrome” based on research with women, and therefore of
no utility in explaining the behaviour of abusive men (who would need to be
studied directly in order to develop a similar profile, such as a “male batterer’s
syndrome”), but its attempted utilization as evidence in a defence for a man
accused of killing his wife represents a highly distorted and dangerous
misapplication.119
In Canada in the infamous legal proceedings around the legal culpability of
Karla Homolka for the sexual torture and killings of young women (including
her own younger sister) which she alleged were perpetrated exclusively by her
husband Paul Bernardo, the “battered woman syndrome” was invoked in her

114. Shaffer, supra note 57, at 17.
115. The Supreme Court of Canada recently determined that a self-defence claim must be
based on a defendant’s reasonable belief that there was no alternative course of action available,
so that it was necessary for him to kill to protect himself from death or grievous bodily harm.
While the case did involve a question of whether Lavallée created a right to “preemptive
killings,” the Court concluded that the defence was intended to cover situations of last resort. R.
v. Cinous, [2000], 2 S.C.R. 3.
116. Melanie Frager Griffith, Note, Battered Women Syndrome: A Tool for Batterers?, 64
FORDHAM L. REV. 141, 148 (1996).
117. Id. at 148-49.
118. See id. Dr. Walker ultimately did not testify at that trial, for reasons which are unclear.
As Griffith points out, she may have been dropped by the defence or have withdrawn from the
case for her own reasons, especially given the storm of negative publicity in the media generated
by her announced appearance, criticism that was especially vocal from advocates for assaulted
women. Id. at 145 n.27.
119. See id. Griffith reports that Dr. Walker has in fact provided expert testimony for the
defence in other trials in which men have been accused of killing their wife. See id. at 146 n.26.
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defence.120 While the violence perpetrated by Bernardo against Homolka may
be relevant to a complete account of the situation, whether or not it could
possibly exonerate Homolka’s responsibility for at best not intervening to stop
and at worst actively participating in these sexual crimes and murders is
another question altogether. In her article on this topic, Melanie Griffith cites
numerous other examples of this misapplication and warns that courts must
strive to assess relevance and thereby avoid various misuses of “battered
woman syndrome.”121 There are also disturbing reports of the “battered
woman syndrome” being used to discredit women’s parenting abilities in cases
of custody disputes where there is a history of domestic violence.122 While
these misapplications of the “battered woman syndrome” do not necessarily
inhere in the description of the syndrome itself, they do, nevertheless, point to
troubling ways in which it can be engaged legally.
However, in spite of these more problematic applications of the “battered
woman syndrome” there have also been some encouraging legal developments
in how it has been understood. In R. v. Mallot, some members of the Supreme
Court of Canada recognized many of the fundamental dilemmas involved in
the use of the battered woman syndrome, in the separate opinion written by
Justice L’Heureux-Dubé, for herself and Justice McLachlin (as she was
then).123 In this opinion, Justice L’Heureux-Dubé articulated a sophisticated
feminist analysis which engaged the contemporary academic commentary on
the hazards which can accompany the use of the battered woman syndrome
and takes judicial note of some of the concerns raised therein.124
The case was not especially significant in terms of any new legal
developments relating to the battered woman syndrome and the defence of
self-defence, as it essentially involved an appeal dismissed unanimously by the
Supreme Court, surrounding whether or not the trial judge’s charge to the jury
supported a conviction for second degree murder for a woman charged with
killing her former common law spouse.125 The facts of the case were relatively
straightforward, and the Court found that the trial judge adequately dealt with
the evidence relating to battered woman syndrome in relation to the accused’s
self-defence claim.126 What is interesting about the judgment, however, is
Justice L’Heureux-Dubé’s expanded articulation of the legal significance of

120. See Anne McGillivray, A Moral Vacuity in Her Which is Impossible to Explain: Law,
Psychiatry and the Remaking of Karla Homolka, 5 INT’L J. LEGAL PROF. 255, 268 (1998).
121. See Griffith, supra note 116, at 175-79.
122. Id. at 80.
123. R. v. Malott, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 123.
124. Id. at 139-45 (L’Heureux-Dubé, J., concurring).
125. Id. at 139 (L’Heureux-Dubé, J., concurring).
126. Id. at 134.
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“battered woman syndrome” and the ways in which it should inform the legal
inquiry into a woman’s self-defence claim in a criminal proceeding.127
Justice L’Heureux-Dubé explained, for example, that it was accepted in
Lavallée that “a woman’s perception of what is reasonable is influenced by her
gender, as well as by her individual experience.”128 This must be the basis
from which a self-defence claim is evaluated. Otherwise, Justice L’HeureuxDubé cautions, “it is possible that those women who are unable to fit
themselves within the stereotype of a victimized, passive, helpless, dependent,
battered woman will not have their claims to self-defence fairly decided.”129
Accepting that the “battered woman syndrome” can tend to reinforce a
stereotypical view of the woman who has experienced violence as passive and
helpless, Justice L’Heureux-Dubé emphasizes the “other elements of a
woman’s social context which help to explain her inability to leave her
abuser,” including a lack of economic resources, fear of retaliation,
responsibility for children, as well as inadequate social support.130 Justice
L’Heureux-Dubé went on to stress that these very factors must “necessarily
inform the reasonableness of a woman’s beliefs or perceptions of, for instance,
her lack of an alternative to the use of deadly force to preserve herself from
death or grievous bodily harm.”131
Finally, Justice L’Heureux-Dubé advised courts on how they can give
practical effect to the principles articulated in the Lavallée decision. In her
words:
To fully accord with the spirit of Lavallée, where the reasonableness of a
battered woman’s belief is at issue in a criminal case, a judge and jury should
be made to appreciate that a battered woman’s experiences are both
individualized, based on her own history and relationships, as well as shared
with other women, within the context of a social and legal system which has
historically undervalued women’s experiences. A judge and jury should be
told that a battered women’s experiences are generally outside the common
understanding of the average judge and juror, and that they should seek to
understand the evidence being presented to them in order to overcome the
myths and stereotypes which we all share. Finally, all of this should be
presented in such a way as to focus on the reasonableness of the woman’s
actions, without relying on old or new stereotypes about battered women.132

In this judicial pronouncement Justice L’Heureux-Dubé demonstrated an
acute sensitivity and nuanced appreciation of the need for legal recognition of
both specificity and generality, the level of the individual and the social, in
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id. at 139-45 (L’Heureux-Dube, J., concurring).
Malott, [1998] 1 S.C.R. at 141 (L’Heureux-Dubé, J., concurring).
Id. at 142 (L’Heureux-Dubé, J., concurring).
Id. at 143-44 (L’Heureux-Dubé, J., concurring).
Id. at 144 (L’Heureux-Dubé, J., concurring).
Id. (L’Heureux-Dubé, J., concurring).
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assessing the self-defence claims of battered women who kill. Moreover, she
exhorted those in the legal arena to acknowledge a general lack of awareness
of the particularities of the experiences of women assaulted by their male
intimates and to struggle against their own stereotypes.133 While the effect of
this kind of legal analysis coming from at least two members of the Supreme
Court of Canada has yet to be seen, its very articulation is an encouraging and
necessary development in correcting some of the stereotypical excesses of the
syndrome. Yet it is not enough to signal that the battered woman syndrome
should be retained in support of the self-defence claims of battered women
who kill. The problems with the syndrome are too daunting, and its defects too
entrenched. Moreover, there are more sophisticated methods for ensuring that
the evidentiary record educates courts about the effects, impacts, and contexts
of intimate violence in women’s lives.
F.

The “Battered Woman Syndrome”: Can It Be Rehabilitated?

Given judicial notice in Canada of the problems with the “battered woman
syndrome”134 and given a considerable literature analysing and critiquing the
syndrome,135 can the concept be salvaged and still be of some utility in legal
contexts in which domestic violence comes into play? There have been many
critiques of the syndrome, and some attempts at reformulating it in a way that
attempts to avoid its worst difficulties in legal contexts.136
Mary Dutton, for example, suggests an expanded version of “battered
woman syndrome” which can be presented in evidence in legal contexts.137 In
her view a redefined “battered woman syndrome” can assist in supporting the
self-defence claims of assaulted women who kill their abusers, through the
provision of carefully crafted expert testimony which addresses factors beyond
the psychological reactions to violence and which acknowledges that these
psychological reactions do not fit neatly into one singular profile.138
Specifically, Dutton advocates a “redefined” version of battered woman
syndrome which comprises four elements: first, an account of the history and
nature of the violence experienced by the woman; second, an exposition of the
particular battered woman’s psychological reactions to the violence she has
experienced; third, an explication of the strategies she used (or did not use) to
escape her abuser prior to killing him; and fourth, an elucidation of the

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

See Malott, [1998] 1 S.C.R. at 144 (L’Heureux-Dube, J., concurring).
Id. at 139-45 (L’Heureux-Dube, J., concurring).
See supra notes 68-70.
See, e.g., Dutton, supra note 68, at 1193 n.1 - n.5.
Id. at 1193-94.
Id. at 1195.
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intervening and contextual factors which influenced the woman’s
psychological response and coping strategies in relation to the violence.139
Dutton’s expanded version of the “battered woman syndrome” is a definite
improvement over the original version espoused by Walker. By including
attention to issues of social context through expert testimony provided to the
Court, by highlighting women’s resistance strategies, and by attending to
differences in the experiences, psychologies, and material resources of women
assaulted by their male intimates, Dutton’s reformulation addresses and
corrects many of the problems which accompany the “battered woman
syndrome” in its original version. In particular, it more fully contextualizes the
particular woman’s experience and attempts to overcome the tendencies
towards stereotyping which the original “battered woman syndrome” typically
entails.
Following Dutton’s recommendations, expert testimony on “battered
woman syndrome” would be greatly improved, and an expanded view of the
problem of violence against women in intimate relationships would be
provided in legal proceedings dealing with it. However, Dutton’s redefined
version of the “syndrome” still accepts the language of syndromization, which
suggests psychological disorder instead of social problem. Additionally, her
redefinition is, although expanded, still an essentially psychologically focused
account of women’s reactions to violence with an emphasis on the individual
psyches of women who have been battered by their male intimates. In this way
it does not entirely avoid the pitfalls of the “battered woman syndrome” in its
traditional version. Nor does it escape evoking the victim-blaming reactions
which many judges or juries may have when they focus on and individual
woman’s reactions to violence and fail to understand her psyche or her actions
as “reasonable.”
Furthermore, Dutton’s emphasis on strategies a “battered woman” has used
with regard to the violence she has experienced can still lead to a
reinforcement of the idea that it is a woman’s responsibility to stop the
violence perpetrated against her. This is not so much a reflection on any defect
in Dutton’s approach as it is a comment on the larger dilemmas surrounding
discussions of women’s resistance strategies in a society pervaded by victim
blaming attitudes. Implicitly, then, a kind of victim-blaming could potentially
seep into the legal inquiry if the focus becomes one of evaluating the number
and efficacy of the resistance/avoidance strategies any “battered woman” has
used. Instead, the inquiry must remain firmly focused on the systematic social
failure to provide adequate resources and multiple options for women who are
experiencing abuse to leave violent men and reconstruct their lives so that their
safety is ensured, while recognizing any efforts a woman was able to make
within these constraints.
139. Id. at 1202.
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Dutton’s proposed redefinition of the “battered woman syndrome” in legal
contexts is a dramatically more sophisticated and contextualized approach to
its traditional use and addresses many of the syndrome’s fundamental flaws.
In more recent writing, Dutton appears to have strengthened her critique of the
“battered woman syndrome,” though she continues to “suggest the need for a
reformulation of this model”140 instead of an outright rejection of it. I would
argue, however, that the very flaws she identifies are such that any
rehabilitative efforts ought to be abandoned in favour of the adoption of
entirely new approaches, ones which expressly refuse to make reference to the
“battered woman syndrome” at all. Instead of relying upon a formulation
which mandates inclusions of certain “pathologies” and decontextualizes
critical aspects of the experience of being assaulted to the detriment of
grasping this experience in all of its complexity, expert evidence should be
marshaled to educate judges and juries about the social causes, contexts, and
impacts of intimate violence without reliance on the “battered woman
syndrome.”
G. Why the Battered Woman Syndrome Should Be Abandoned: Alternative
Evidentiary Approaches
Among the most problematic elements of the so-called “battered woman
syndrome” is the construct of “learned helplessness” which rests at the core of
the syndrome.141 In this view, the battered woman has learned to become
helpless through her prolonged exposure to violence at the hands of her
husband and is, in fact, characterized as mentally disordered as a result of the
abuse she has suffered.142 But in psychologizing and individualizing the issue
in these terms, the focus is deflected away from recognition of first, the social
conditions which often keep women trapped in relationships with violent men
(including indifferent or inadequate police response, financial dependence,
child care responsibilities, poverty, and the husband’s threat to kill her and her
children if she leaves, etc.); and second, the many ways in which women who
are battered do actively struggle to survive, resist, and fight back against the
violence they experience (hardly consistent with the traditional image of the
passive, helpless victim which inheres in the battered woman syndrome).143
Most fundamentally, the “battered woman syndrome,” both in its original
conception and in the way it has been taken up in law, reflects a preoccupation

140. Mary Ann Dutton, Critique of the “Battered Woman Syndrome” Model, available at
http://www.vaw.umn.edu/documents/vawnet/bws/bws.html (1996).
141. WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE, supra note 70, at 49-53.
142. See id. at 50.
143. See id. at 10.
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with victimization at the expense of any recognition of agency.144 This is part
of a larger social tendency to understand victimization and agency in
dichotomous terms, as existing as binary opposites. Glaringly absent from
most representations of violence in intimate heterosexual relationships, then, is
attention to the many and complicated ways in which the violence is contested
and resisted by assaulted women. Instead, the focus is typically on the ways in
which battered women are rendered helpless victims.145
Equally absent is any acknowledgment of the larger failings of the very
systems and institutions that are supposed to protect against and provide
remedies for this violence, failings that undercut women’s resistance strategies.
More importantly still, the larger context of social inequality which produces
this violence in women’s lives in the first place is typically dropped out of
view. This results in most dominant representations, including legal
representations of the lives of women who experience ongoing violence and
abuse from men,146 failing to incorporate a view of women’s lives which
reflects both the structures of inequality which shape these lives and the
possibilities and expressions of agency within these structures.
It is this broader and skewed depiction of violence against women which
underpins the “battered woman syndrome” and its use in legal contexts. This
reason, among others, means that the doctrine must ultimately be abandoned in
favour of more contextualized and sophisticated psycho-social accounts which
can be offered up by qualified experts giving evidence to courts, who grasp
both the macro and micro levels of assaulted women’s experiences.
If the “battered woman syndrome” should be abandoned because it is
conceptually inadequate for the task of educating courts about the causes,
contexts, and impacts of domestic violence in women’s lives, what is a
preferred approach? One Canadian commentator has suggested that critical
attention should be paid to more skillful utilization of the already existing
defences in criminal law that might assist those battered women who kill in
self-defence.147 Arguing for better use of the structures of the defences
“already in place” to bring forth evidence of domestic violence when women
144. Eliane Chiu, Confronting the Agency in Battered Mothers, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1223,
1224-28 (2001).
145. Id. at 1225.
146. In this paper I restrict my analysis to women’s experiences of violence in heterosexual
relationships. The experiences of women in same-sex relationships with violence and abuse
warrant a separate analysis which takes into account the social context of homophobia and the
differing ways in which gender is and isn’t salient in same-sex relationships. For a thoughtful
exploration of these issues, see Mary Eaton, Abuse by Any Other Name: Feminism, Difference
and Intralesbian Violence, in THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE: THE DISCOVERY OF
DOMESTIC ABUSE, supra note 34, at 195.
147. Julianne Parfett, Beyond Battered Woman Syndrome Evidence: An Alternative Approach
to the Use of Abuse Evidence in Spousal Homicide Cases, 12 WINDSOR REV. LEGAL & SOC.
ISSUES 55, 79 (2001).
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kill their violent male intimate, Julianne Parfett makes the case that, in addition
to self-defence, provocation (to diminish culpability), and in some cases
insanity, may support the claims of battered women who kill.148 But in spite of
her effective critique of the “battered woman syndrome,” Parfett’s
recommendations remain, by her own admission, “individualistic.”149 While
attention to the individual circumstances of any criminal defendant is essential,
the set of recommendations Parfett proposes fails to engage with and advance
an analysis of domestic violence and its impact that grasps its social contexts
and consequences, as these are lived at the level of individual women’s lives.
Moreover, Parfett’s recommended reforms would, in fact, aggravate the legal
situation given the problematic nature of these defences, particularly
provocation.
On a different strategic and evidentiary track, one that expressly engages
social conditions, Evan Stark recommends the substitution of what he calls the
“coercive control framework” for the current uses of the “battered woman
syndrome” in legal contexts.150 For Stark, this alternative framework more
fully captures the “hostage like” conditions of entrapment and subordination in
which many “battered women” live.151 Moreover, this framework, which
“emphasizes the batterer’s pattern of coercion and control rather than the
violent acts of their effect on victim psychology”152 shifts the focus to:
[T]he basis of women’s justice claims from stigmatizing psychological
assessments of traumatization to the links between structural inequality, the
systemic nature of women’s oppression in particular relationship, and the
harms associated with domination and resistance as it has been lived.153

Through this “coercive control framework,” Stark claims that expert evidence
can discourage stereotyping of “battered woman syndrome” and accommodate
women’s differences including not only their differing reactions to violence
(which may include anger instead of passivity) but also their differences in
social location, including along lines of class and race.154
148. Id.
149. Id. at 56-65.
150. Stark, supra note 1, at 975-76.
151. Id. at 975.
152. Id. at 975-76.
153. Id. at 976.
154. Despite these very promising developments in Stark’s alternative explanatory
framework, he at times lapses into some problematic language in his analysis. For example, in
advocating for the benefits of his own “coercive control framework” he refers to the relative
advantage of explanations of battering which start with an affirmative conception of womanhood
and proceed to describe how objective dimensions of entrapment have deconstructed the most
essential facets of feminine identity. Id. at 1021. But what an “affirmative conception of
womanhood” or the “essential” facets of a feminine identity are remain unidentified by Stark.
Apart from the essentializing tendencies of this formulation, Stark also in places uses language
which, despite his efforts to the contrary, reproduces the very problems of stereotyping he seeks
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One concern is that Stark’s “coercive control model” may be taken up and
dismissed in legal contexts as mere “advocacy,” a point raised by Joan
Meier.155 To the extent that courts seem to prefer expert testimony which can
be characterized as “scientific,” Stark’s explicitly political model may carry
less weight than more “scientific” psychological theories and accounts.156
Still, this is a strategic issue to be worked out in the context of specific legal
cases. At any rate Stark’s vision of the kind of expert testimony to be offered
in support of battered women’s self-defence claims has the definite advantage
of deflecting attention away from the “why did she stay” question and focusing
more on providing a contextual analysis of violence against women in intimate
relationships and its links to the very real and material conditions of sexual
inequality in which it is situated and lived.
In addition to expert evidence to educate juries and the judiciary about
these material conditions and the way in which they shape and constrain
women’s choices, a rich psychological literature is emerging, which, when
integrated with a gender analysis goes a long way towards explaining the
traumatic effects of intimate violence in women’s lives.157 Some of the ground
breaking work in this area was undertaken by Judith Herman, whose book
Trauma and Recovery began to develop an articulation of the intersections
between the effects of privatized traumatic events in women’s lives such as
domestic violence and sexual assault and the way in which this trauma
parallels some of the experiences of public, political terrorism.158 Developing
some of the themes in this area and expressly incorporating a gender analysis
into the psychological trauma literature, some feminist psychologists are
developing accounts of the ways in which post-traumatic stress is the normal
response to abnormal events such as violence and abuse in an intimate
relationship.159 Contextualized evidence about post-traumatic stress
“disorder”160 is more appropriate insofar as “it shifts the focus away from the
to avoid. For instance, he begins one paragraph by speaking of “what creates a battered woman,”
terminology which still evokes that identifiable “class” of “victims” known as “battered women,”
itself an act of pathologizing. Stark, supra note 1, at 1026.
155. Meier, supra note 68, at 1320.
156. Id.; Stark, supra note 1, at 979.
157. Meier, supra note 68, at 1321-22.
158. JUDITH HERMAN, TRAUMA AND RECOVERY: THE AFTERMATH OF VIOLENCE – FROM
DOMESTIC ABUSE TO POLITICAL TERROR 2-3 (1992).
159. See, e.g., LORI HASKELL, FIRST STAGE TRAUMA TREATMENT: A GUIDE FOR MENTAL
HEALTH PROFESSIONALS WORKING WITH WOMEN 1 (2003). For a more general discussion of
domestic violence and post-traumatic stress, see generally Anita K. McGruden et al.,
Interpersonal Violence and Post-Traumatic Symptomatology: The Effects of Ethnicity, Gender
and Exposure to Violent Events, 15 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 206 (2000).
160. Haskell, supra note 159, at 6. The use of the term “disorder” has been appropriately
criticized by feminist writers for its stigmatizing effects. Lori Haskell argues that “this label
implies that there is something wrong with the person, rather than acknowledging that the person
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‘personality’ or ‘character’ of the battered woman, and describes her
behaviours as a natural human response to trauma imposed from external
sources.”161
Expert evidence presented by qualified mental health professionals whose
understanding of post-traumatic stress (a recognized diagnostic category in the
fourth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(“DSM-IV”)) expressly incorporates a recognition of gender (and other social)
inequalities can be of significant assistance to legal proceedings relating to
domestic violence.162 Specifically, this kind of evidentiary record can enable
legal factfinders to situate their knowledge of an individual assaulted woman
within an analysis of the social contexts and dynamics of domestic violence
generally and how these are relevant to the particular legal issues at play.
These richer, socio-psychological accounts offer the opportunity to assist
courts in coming to terms with and developing more sophisticated
understandings of the conditions of the lives of assaulted women and the
circumstances in which they make their individual choices and decisions.
IV. UNCOOPERATIVE VICTIMS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM:
RESPONSES TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
A.

Blaming Battered Women for Refusing to Cooperate with Criminal
Prosecutions

It is well documented that many women who have experienced ongoing
violence against them in their intimate relationships are reluctant to assist with
the criminal prosecution of their partners.163 In these situations, women do not
cooperate with the Crown attorney or prosecutor in charge of the case in a
variety of ways. Most often it is by failing to appear in criminal proceedings
relating to the episodes of domestic violence they experienced or by recanting
once on the witness stand.164 The reasons for women’s ambivalence about
these criminal proceedings are varied and complex and range from (but are not

is dealing with typical and normal repercussions from having experienced a traumatic life event
or events.” Id. She recommends that the term post-traumatic stress “responses” replace the term
“syndrome” or “disorder.” Id.
161. Meier, supra note 68, at 1313-14.
162. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS § 309.81 (4th ed. 1994).
163. TIM ROBERTS, SPOUSAL ASSAULT AND MANDATORY CHARGING IN THE YUKON:
EXPERIENCES,
PERSPECTIVES
AND
ALTERNATIVES
(1996),
available
at
http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/ps/rs/re/wd96-3a-e.html; Lauren Bennett et al., Systemic Obstacles
to the Criminal Prosecution of a Battering Partner, 14 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 761, 762
(1999).
164. Myrna Dawson & Ronit Dinovitzer, Victim Cooperation and the Prosecution of
Domestic Violence in a Specialized Court, 18 JUST. Q. 593, 594, 596 (2001).
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limited to) a belief that the criminal justice system will not meet their needs,
fear of retaliation from the abuser, a commitment to reconciliation with the
abuser, and a desire to protect him from sanctions.165 Thus, there is a definite
likelihood that the woman who has been the victim of the very violence
requiring police intervention will choose not to actively engage with the
ensuing processing of the charge through the court system.
It should be pointed out, however, that the emphasis on so-called
“uncooperative victims” obscures the important fact that a great deal of women
who report violence to the police do continue on and “cooperate” fully in the
ensuing criminal prosecution.166 Nevertheless, the co-existing fact that many
women do refuse to participate with the criminal prosecution of their violent
male intimates, even after having initially called upon the police seeking
intervention, causes considerable frustration, confusion, and resentment on the
part of key players in the legal system (including police officers,
prosecutors/Crown attorneys, and judges).
In some cases, there is a tendency on the part of court personnel to
characterize women who refuse to cooperate as “manipulative” or as having
lied about the abuse in the first place.167 More generally, there is an explicit
pinpointing of responsibility for the failure of domestic violence cases either to
be processed fully or to result in a conviction, in the corresponding “failure” of
the woman victim to assist the state by cooperating fully and testifying against
the batterer.168 As two Canadian researchers point out, “prosecutors often
explain low rates of prosecution by emphasizing that victims of domestic
violence tend to change their minds about pressing charges, often recanting
their testimonies and/or becoming “non-cooperative witnesses.”169 This type
of argument may be advanced from either a sympathetic or a critical
viewpoint, but in either case it paradoxically assumes that assaulted women
have a disproportionate amount of power over the functioning of the criminal
justice system.
In any event, there is a perception that the women who are “reluctant” or
“uncooperative” victims have not fulfilled their part of the bargain; in other
words, they have enlisted the assistance of the state by calling upon the police
for help but have then failed to follow through with the system’s subsequent

165. Bennett, supra note 163, at 764-69.
166. See, e.g., Dawson & Dinovitzer, supra note 164, at 610 (reporting that their review of
criminal justice system processing of domestic violence cases in one specialized court in Toronto
found that “approximately 55% of all victims cooperated with the prosecution”).
167. In a thoughtful article critically analysing the debates about mandated participation in
domestic violence prosecutions, Cheryl Hanna relays stories of training fellow prosecutors about
domestic violence and hearing reactions from her colleagues characterizing assaulted women
reluctant to testify as “lying about the abuse or hiding something.” Hanna, supra note 7, at 1882.
168. See id. at 1883.
169. Dawson & Dinovitzer, supra note 164, at 594.
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requirements.170 The difficulty with this view, however, is that it assumes that
the “system” can, and typically does, effectively respond to the needs of
assaulted women. Moreover, it fails to address the inadequacies in legal
responses to domestic violence from the point of view of the woman whose
rights it is supposed to protect.171
B.

Criminalizing “Bad” Victims

Some of the discourse surrounding “uncooperative victims” has revolved
around and is directly connected to larger debates about relatively recent legal
interventions into domestic violence such as mandatory arrest and mandatory,
or “no-drop,” prosecution policies.172 There is a deeply held assumption,
certainly one which is understandable, that a critical component of the strategy
aimed at deprivatizing domestic violence, assuming social responsibility for
the problem, and holding abusers accountable, requires aggressive
criminalization of the problem of domestic violence.173 Tied to this is the view
that once contact with the police is made, abusers should be arrested and
criminal prosecutions should be vigorously pursued.174 This, in fact, has
become a cornerstone of contemporary legal responses to domestic violence,
responses which are directly attributable to the advocacy efforts of those
associated with social movements committed to ending violence in women’s
lives.175

170. Angela Corsilles, No-Drop Policies in the Prosecution of Domestic Violence Cases:
Guarantee to Action or Dangerous Solution?, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 853, 865 (1994).
171. While the criminal justice system is obviously not set up to vindicate individual rights in
the way that private law is, there is, nevertheless, the idea that those victimized by crime will see
justice done within this system.
172. See generally, e.g., Erin L. Han, Note, Mandatory Arrest and No-Drop Policies: Victim
Empowerment in Domestic Violence Cases, 23 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 159 (2003).
173. See Ruth Jones, Guardianship for Coercively Controlled Battered Women: Breaking the
Control of the Abuser, 88 GEO L.J. 605, 629.
174. Most jurisdictions in North America have implemented policies to this effect. See, e.g.,
TREVOR BROWN, CHARGING AND PROSECUTION POLICIES IN CASES OF SPOUSAL ASSAULT: A
SYNTHESIS OF RESEARCH, ACADEMIC, AND JUDICIAL RESPONSES iii (2000), available at
http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/ps/rs/rep/rr01-5a-e.pdf.
175. There is a voluminous literature analysing these policies from a variety of perspectives.
It is impossible to reference even a fraction of it, but a few (arbitrary) selections include:
ROBERTS, supra note 163; STATISTICS CANADA, supra note 18; Jacqueline Faubert & Ronald
Hinch, The Dialectics of Mandatory Arrest Policies, in POST CRITICAL CRIMINOLOGY 230
(Thomas O’Reilly-Fleming, ed., 1996); J.E. Ursel, Mandatory Charging: The Manitoba Model, in
UNSETTLING TRUTHS: BATTERED WOMEN, POLICY, POLITICS, AND CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH
IN CANADA 73 (Kevin Bonnycastle & George S. Rikalos, eds. 1998); Hanna, supra note 7;
Dennis P. Saccuzzo, How Should Police Respond to Domestic Violence: A Therapeutic
Jurisprudence Analysis of Mandatory Arrest, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 765 (1999); Lawrence
Sherman et al., The Variable Effects of Arrest on Criminal Careers: The Milwaukee Domestic
Violence Experiment, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137 (1992); Vito Nicholas Ciraco, Note,
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The debate about the merits of no-drop or mandatory prosecution in
domestic violence cases is a complex one, with highly compelling arguments
marshaled on each side of the divide.176 The crux of the matter is often seen to
be the tension between a legitimate social interest in eradicating domestic
violence through criminalization and the contradictions inherent in further
disempowering already disempowered women whose lives have been damaged
by the harmful effects of intimate violence, by stripping from them any choice
in the decision to prosecute.177 My point is not to engage these arguments
directly, but is instead to excavate the underlying assumptions which shape the
discourse surrounding the role of so-called “uncooperative victims” in
domestic violence cases in the criminal justice system.
Some of the criminal law reforms made in the area of domestic violence
prosecution address precisely the issue of women’s “reluctance” to “cooperate”
in the court system.178 The most of important of these is the attempt to proceed
with criminal prosecutions without reliance on the testimony of the victim by
relying, for example, on other evidence such as 911 tapes, photographs of
injuries, videotaped statements, and evidence from other witnesses (such as
neighbours).179 This form of “enhanced” or “vigorous” prosecution has been
formally implemented in jurisdictions such as San Diego and is also one of the
models on which the specialized domestic violence courts in Ontario, Canada
are premised.180 The efficacy of these reforms, however, and the extent to
which they are actually operationalized has yet to be the subject of systematic
or rigorous evaluation (although this has been repeatedly requested by
community groups and other key stakeholders in Ontario).
Because “uncooperative victims” are seen to pose such a powerful obstacle
to the successful prosecution of domestic violence cases, significant attention
has been paid to how they should be treated.181 Some jurisdictions allow for a
variety of legal remedies to be taken against women who fail to appear and/or
refuse to testify in domestic violence cases.182 One of the more disturbing of
these is the punitive response witnessed in the attempt to criminalize women
who refuse to appear or testify in domestic violence cases in which they are

Fighting Domestic Violence with Mandatory Arrest, Are We Winning?: An Analysis in New
Jersey, 22 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 169 (2001).
176. See Corsilles, supra note 170, at 857.
177. See generally Jessica Dayton, Essay, The Silencing of a Women’s Choice: Mandatory
Arrest and No Drop Prosecution Policies in Domestic Violence Cases, 9 CARDOZO WOMEN’S
L.J. 281, 288 (2003).
178. See generally Corsilles, supra note 170.
179. Tonya McCormick, Comment, Convicting Domestic Violence Abusers When the Victim
Remains Silent, 13 BYU J. PUB. L. 427, 437-38 (1999).
180. See STATISTICS CANADA, supra note 18.
181. See Han, supra note 172, at 161-62.
182. San Diego is just one example of this. See Hanna, supra note 7, at 1863.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

140

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:107

victim-witnesses.183 On this approach, the very women who are victimized by
intimate violence in the first place, and who struggle to cope with this violence
to the best of their abilities, paradoxically themselves become victims of the
coercive power of the criminal law.
In the United States, in a well publicized case in Alaska in 1983,184 a
woman was jailed for refusing to testify, a criminal justice system response
which was subject to heated media debate.185 While this is hardly a
widespread reality, there have been numerous similar incidents since that time
in North America.186 Under a policy recently developed in the United
Kingdom, the Crown Prosecution Service unveiled guidelines that are intended
to see that domestic assaults are treated more seriously than random acts of
violence.187 As part of that strategy, women who refuse to “cooperate” with
prosecutions of domestic violence were officially put on notice that they may,
in fact, find that they are themselves the subject of criminal prosecution.188
Citing a study which reported that in eight out of ten times where criminal
proceedings were dropped the reason was because the victim had “refused to
co-operate,” this policy is supposed to demonstrate the “tough on crime”
approach to combating domestic violence in Britain.189
Arguments in favour of using the punitive powers of the criminal justice
system against the very women who are the victims of domestic violence are
premised on the idea that these “bad” victims need to be brought into line and
compelled to assist the state. But this idea utterly fails to come to grips with
the costs associated with “engaging the state” faced by assaulted women and
the negative repercussions such an engagement often entails. As Elizabeth
Schneider argues, the dilemma of the criminalization model in general – also
seen in the dilemma of criminalizing battered women for “non-compliance” –
is “the promise of an ‘autonomous liberal legal self’ which does not encompass
the human and material experiences of women who are battered or take into
account the gendered realities of their lives.”190

183. Casey Gwinn & Anne O’Dell, Stopping the Violence: The Role of the Police Officer and
the Prosecutor, 20 W. ST. U. L. REV. 297, 313 (1993).
184. See, e.g., Richard D. Friedman & Bridget McCormack, Dial in Testimony, 150 U. PA. L.
REV. 1171, 1189 (2001-02).
185. See Hanna, supra note 1, at 1866-67.
186. See, e.g., Mark Anthony Drumbl, Civil, Constitutional and Criminal Justice Responses
to Female Partner Abuse: Proposals for Reform, 12 CAN. J. FAM. L. 115, 149 (1994-1995).
187. See CROWN PROTECTION SERVICE, ZERO TOLERANCE FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, at
http://www.cps.gov.uk/Home/archive/136-01.htm (Nov. 28, 2001).
188. Brit. Broadcasting Company, Domestic Violence Victims Face Jail, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/1680069.stm (Nov. 28, 2001).
189. Id.
190. ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING 188
(2000).
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C. “Helpless” Victims and Unhelpful Witnesses: The Costs of Prosecutions
on Women
Women’s voices are relatively absent from legal scholarship on the impact
and efficacy of legal system in relation to domestic violence, but an emerging
literature does reveal some important findings.191 One of the most significant
is that assaulted women are not a homogeneous group, and their reasons for
their responses to the criminal justice system vary.192 In spite of this, distinct
themes emerge both from the perceptions of Crown attorneys, prosecutors,
victim advocates, police officers, and other system personnel about assaulted
women’s reactions and, more importantly, from the small but important body
of research in this area documenting women’s own experiences within the
criminal justice system.193 One of these is the tension between many assaulted
women’s fear of her violent male intimate and the corresponding levels of fear
and/or distrust of the criminal justice system.194 Essentially, in trying to devise
a survival strategy in the face of intimate violence, women’s experiences of the
criminal justice system reflect a deep ambivalence about its ability to offer a
remedy that does not extract more from them than whatever relief or solution it
potentially offers.
Studies of assaulted women’s reactions to the criminal justice system in
Canada show a fairly high degree of support for mandatory arrest but a
significantly lower level of support for mandatory prosecution of domestic
violence cases.195 Why is this? One reason appears to lie in the assessments
individual women make about the investment their participation requires

191. See generally Burth E. Fleury, Missing Voices: Patterns of Battered Women’s
Satisfaction with the Criminal Legal System, 8 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, 181 (2002); see also
Edna Erez & Joanne Belknap, In Their Own Words: Battered Women’s Assessment of the
Criminal Processing System’s Responses, 13 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 251 (1998) (examining the
handling of domestic violence cases by the criminal justice system and the victim’s perception of
the responses of the system); Tammy Landau, Women’s Experience with Mandatory Charging
for Wife Assault in Ontario, Canada: A Case Against the Prosecution, 7 INT’L REV.
VICTIMOLOGY 141 (2000); Joanne C. Minaker, Evaluating Criminal Justice Responses to
Intimate Abuse Through the Lens of Women’s Needs, 13 CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 74 (2001).
192. Minaker, supra note 191, at 81.
193. See generally id.
194. Erez & Belknap, supra note 191, at 260-61. The study reported that:
The victims were requested to rate the importance of various reasons for which they were
unwilling to cooperate with prosecution. Fear of the batterer received the highest score,
with a mean of 4.51 (on a scale of 1-5 where 5 is the highest score); followed by the
ineffectiveness of the system (4.35), concern for the children (4.02), distrust of the
criminal processing system (4.02), difficult experiences with the criminal processing
system (3.87), emotional dependency on the batterer (3.74), economic dependency on the
abuser (3.47), and the least influential factor was lack of support from the family (2.62).
Id.
195. See BROWN, supra note 174, at 3. See generally Landau, supra note 191, at 147.
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against the outcome it entails,196 as it is essentially a paradigmatically rational
cost-benefit analysis.
A British study, for example, based on interviews with assaulted women,
found that for some of them the cost was often not worth the sentence.197 As
Carolyn Hoyle explains, in these cases, “victims made rational choices, within
the constraints as they perceived them.”198 The three main reasons offered for
not wanting police intervention and/or not wanting to assist with criminal
prosecutions were as follows:
Some women did not want to break up the relationship or the family unit;
secondly some were afraid of further retaliatory violence; and thirdly, some did
not think that the likely sentence would be worth the “costs” incurred by the
process. All three reasons concern the high costs, of various sorts, that victims
can incur by supporting a prosecution.199

In other words, the toll taken by participating in the criminal justice system
would not be compensated by a sentence sufficiently serious to have made the
effort worth it. Clearly this latter concern is quite an indictment of the criminal
justice system response to domestic violence from the eyes of those it is
supposed to serve.
Even the typically cited fear of reprisal as a reason for “non-cooperation”
implicitly reveals a concern with the state’s failure and/or inability to protect
assaulted women from further or escalated violence. Studies have found that
this fear is, in fact, a major reason cited for electing not to pursue or assist with
criminal prosecution of batterers.200 And, given that it has been repeatedly
demonstrated that assaulted women are at greatest risk for violence and murder
upon separating from violent male intimates, the fear of reprisal is often
sufficient to deter an assaulted woman from pursuing prosecution and to keep
her in a relationship with a violent man.
The trouble with the idea of the “uncooperative victim,” then, is that the
criminal justice system processing of domestic violence cases, with all of the
critically important innovations and reforms which have been and continue to
be implemented remains, in many instances, at odds with the needs of women
coping with violence perpetrated by their male intimates. What is needed,
therefore, is a reframe of the idea of the “uncooperative victim” or “reluctant
witness,” one that shifts the object of the inquiry away from the woman’s
responses and onto the barriers which interfere with and/or limit the possibility
196. See generally EVE S. BUZAWA & CARL G. BUZAWA, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 177-89 (3d ed. 2003).
197. CAROLYN HOYLE, NEGOTIATING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: POLICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE
AND VICTIMS 184 (Roger Hood ed., 1998).
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Erez & Balknap, supra note 191, at 254; Barbara Hart, Battered Women and the
Criminal Justice System, 36 AM. BEHAVIOURAL SCIENTIST 624, 625 (1993).
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of a successful prosecution. In this way, by changing the focus and adjusting
the lens of the inquiry, it becomes possible to understand that the choices made
by a so-called “uncooperative victim,” in many instances, may be quite rational
and reasonable ones given the particular circumstances of her life.
D. Enhancing the Likelihood of Prosecution Without Criminalizing Women
Who Are Reluctant Witnesses
Given that “legal remedies are an essential tool in stopping domestic
violence,”201 at least part of the state’s response will continue be a
criminalization strategy. The role of the assaulted woman as victim-witness,
therefore, will also continue to be a pivotal one. A study from Toronto’s K
court, a specialized court established to process domestic violence cases, found
that a case is seven times more likely to be prosecuted if the Crown perceives
the woman to be a “cooperative” witness.202 But the question of what to do
about the “reluctant witness” and/or the “uncooperative victim” in this context
should be reposed to focus on what can be done to enhance the possibility of
successfully prosecuting cases of domestic violence, which in turn entails
ongoing and critical scrutiny of the system itself.
One of the studies of assaulted women’s experiences with the criminal
justice system found that “the major reasons for willingness to cooperate with
the criminal processing system were (1) stopping the abusive behaviour . . .
followed by (2) sending a message that the behaviour is criminal . . . , and (3)
punishing the abuser.”203 The first reason goes back to and requires a belief
that the criminal justice system will actually provide an effective interruption
into men’s violence against women in intimate relationships. This belief can
only be bolstered by the second and third reasons cited by the women
interviewed, namely that a conviction will ensue to which a serious penalty
will attach.
The same study showed that women’s level of satisfaction with criminal
justice system personnel was highest for victim assistance staff.204 Other
studies have confirmed the critically important role of advocates within the
criminal justice system whose role is to inform victim-witnesses about the
nature of the proceedings and support them throughout. For example, one
study of the processing of domestic violence cases in Toronto found that a
woman is three times more likely to be willing to testify and thereby aid the
prosecution, if she met with someone from Victim Witness Program.205 Other

201. Lisa G. Lerman, The Decontextualization of Domestic Violence, 83 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 217, 220 (1992).
202. Dawson & Dinovitzer, supra note 164, at 613.
203. Erez & Belknap, supra note 191, at 262.
204. Id.
205. Dawson and Dinovitzer, supra note 164, at 614.
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research has confirmed this same thing. “Battered women who receive
advocacy services . . . are more likely than others to continue their case
through to conviction.”206
This points to the need for more resources within the criminal justice
system to respond to the complexities and challenges these kinds of cases pose.
As one commentator points out,
If the prosecutor adopts a policy of aggressively prosecuting abuse cases but
fails to provide victim advocacy services to maintain contact with the victims,
attend to their safety needs and help them to understand the law enforcement
system, then the prosecutor often is doomed to frustration because the victims
of abuse are less likely to remain available to testify.207

Widening the lens further still, a range of other legal reforms are required
to deal with domestic violence, some of which are being implemented, and
some of which are still to be devised. Along with these reforms, constant
evaluation of our efforts to respond to domestic violence through legal means
must be undertaken, in order to assess the efficacy of these reform and of the
system overall. Wider still, we must keep in mind that legal responses to
domestic violence can only ever be a part of a broader strategy aimed at ending
a deeply entrenched and multiply constituted social problem such as men’s
violence against women and children.
E.

Uncooperative Victims and Women’s Agency

As Cheryl Hanna points out, “the question of what the battered woman’s
role in the prosecution process ought to be often masks ambivalence about
what her role in the abusive relationship is.”208 She also points to
characterizations of what a “real” or “ideal” victim of domestic violence is and
how she behaves.209 As Hanna continues:
Women who want to follow through with prosecution are seen either as the
true victims of domestic violence or as manipulators with an agenda. Women
who do not want to proceed are characterized either as agents in the battering –
allowing it to continue because of their lack of cooperation with the state – or
as true victims who have “learned helplessness.”210

The “uncooperative victim,” then, like those afflicted with the “battered
woman syndrome,” is part of the complex “image problem” assaulted women
have in relation to legal responses to domestic violence.
206. BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 196, at 192; see also Arlene Weisz, Legal Advocacy
for Domestic Violence Survivors: The Power of an Informative Relationship, 80 FAM. IN SOC’Y.
138 (1999).
207. Lerman, supra note 201, at 221.
208. Hanna, supra note 7, at 1883.
209. Id. at 1878.
210. Id. at 1883.
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In each of these cases, the image problem regarding “victims” reflects the
difficulty reconciling victimization with agency, a difficulty also reflected in
law. Either the “uncooperative victim” is entirely helpless and fails to appear
or refuses to testify about the abuse because she is paralyzed by fear and is
thereby a “true victim,” utterly without agency, or the “uncooperative victim”
is a lying manipulator, expressing an excess of agency by exerting her will in
refusing to assist the prosecution, and thereby negates her status as a true
victim. Even her credibility is in doubt, as perhaps she is to blame for what
happened all along. The “uncooperative victim,” therefore, like the “battered
woman” with the “battered woman syndrome,” exemplifies the polarized and
antithetical extremes of the split between victim and agent in representations of
assaulted women.
V. RECONCILING THE VICTIM / AGENT DICHOTOMY IN
LEGAL ACCOUNTS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
A.

Reifying Victims/Obliterating Agency

Within broader discourses surrounding violence against women is the
tendency to define women who have experienced violence exclusively in terms
of this experience, a tendency sharply evident in dominant images of the
“victims” of domestic violence. It is as if women’s experiences of violence
define something essential about who they are, as if being a victim becomes an
identity in and of itself. Yet this category – “victim” – is one with which most
women do not identify, and in which most women do not want to recognize
themselves and their own lives.211 As Elizabeth Stanko observes,
Creating a category “victim” is one way of dealing with women’s experiences
of male violence. The role and status of “victim” is separate from that of all
women. “Victimism”, the practice of objectifying women’s experiences of
male violence, serves to deny the commonality among sexually and/or
physically assaulted women . . . .212

For example, in the commonly used descriptor “battered woman,”
universalizing, homogenizing, and static tendencies inhere. In fact, a
caricature of the “battered woman” as a particular type of “victim” is embodied
within the “battered woman syndrome.” Not only does it suggest that there is a
uniformity to women’s experiences of physical abuse in their intimate
heterosexual relationships, it also linguistically constructs a category of
women – battered women – who are defined in terms of the violence done to
them, and who, as a result, are assumed to be in some fundamental way
different and separate from all other (“normal”/non-battered) women.

211. See generally STANKO, supra note 26, at 16-19.
212. Id. at 16.
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Researcher Donileen Loseke describes the gap between “official”
definitions (and associated images) of “battered women” and the subjective
labeling of experience on the part of women she interviewed who stayed at a
shelter for assaulted women in the United States.213 Loseke writes that “it
sometimes seemed that women preferred any label other than ‘batterer’ for
their partners and any label other than ‘abused wife’ for themselves.”214 As
she explains,
[O]fficial definitions might not encourage social members to use these images
as interpretive devices in the complex process of naming individual troubles.
Just as most violence as experienced is not obviously the type defined as “wife
abuse” [that is, violence in its most extreme and brutal forms], the morally
condemned “killer drunk” image of drinking drivers does not match subjective
interpretations where such persons often seem to be merely “social drinkers”
who drive without luck.215

This resistance to seeing oneself as a “victim” of violence may very well be
directly linked to the more troubling aspects of the prevailing representation of
the category, in particular its attendant associations with utter helplessness and
passivity. In this construction, women’s strengths, survival skills, and
strategies of resistance are rendered invisible because the dichotomous
opposition of passive-victim/active-agent cannot accommodate victimization
and resistance within the same conceptual framework.216 Articulating this
dilemma in terms of her own refusal of the category “battered woman,”
feminist legal scholar Martha Mahoney reveals that one of the experiences of
violence relayed in her article theorizing legal images of battered woman is her
own.217 But, she takes pains to emphasize that:
I do not feel like a “battered woman.” Really, I want to say that I am not, since
the phrase conjures up an image that fails to describe either my marriage or my
sense of myself. It is a difficult claim to make for several reasons: the gap
between my self-perceived competence and strength and my own image of
battered women, the inevitable attendant loss of my own denial of painful
experience, and the certainty that the listener cannot hear such a claim without
filtering it through a variety of derogatory stereotypes.218

Mahoney’s sudden and unexpected insertion of her own experience of violence
in an intimate relationship, into her scholarly text analysing legal images of
battered women, is a powerful and courageous discursive maneuver. It is an

213. Donileen R. Loseke, Lived Realties and the Construction of Social Problems: The Case
of Wife Abuse, 10 SYMBOLIC INTERACTION 229 (1987).
214. Id. at 236.
215. Id. at 240.
216. See Mahoney, supra note 39, at 62.
217. Mahoney, supra note 13, at 8.
218. Id. at 8.
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intervention which effectively disrupts and then subverts the “us/them”
dichotomy which implicitly runs through so much of the writing on violence
against women by academics and “experts.”
In fact, in the same article, Mahoney addresses the way in which
professional distancing from the problem of domestic violence occurs in the
legal system, as elsewhere, through a dominant ideology that denies the
profound and personal impacts of oppression.219 This is a form of the denial,
silence, and minimization which so often takes place in society at large about
the subject of violence against women and children, as if it is an unfortunate or
impolite topic of conversation, as if it is something which affects other people,
not “us.” This denial also manifests itself within courtrooms as well as in the
professional and scholarly discourses on the topic.220 As Mahoney points out:
“[D]espite the statistics on the epidemic incidence of domestic violence, there
is almost no legal or social science scholarship that describes an author’s
experience of violence or even indicates that the author has had any such
experience.”221 Yet “it is unlikely,” she notes wryly, “that a disinterested body
of social scientists is doing all this research.”222
However, the idea persists that there exists a distinct category of women,
identifiable by their experiences of physical assault in intimate relationships
and the psychological effects of this violence.223 It is visible in the very ease
with which the category “battered women” is deployed, especially in the legal
and psychological literature on the topic.224 This classification is widely and
easily used as if it speaks to a particular class of women.
It is commonly heard in popular discourse, including in the media where
there are countless instances and examples. For example, in a CBC radio
interview on the inquest recently completed in Ontario into the deaths of a
number of “battered women,”225 the reporter discussed the death of Arlene
Mays, a woman whose common law spouse killed her after subjecting her to
ongoing and escalating violence, and after every avenue of escape she had tried
(including legal interventions and restraining orders) had failed to protect
her.226 In responding to the CBC interviewer’s question, the reporter
emphasized that “we” must understand how the system failed “women like
this,” indicating through this turn of phrase, that there is an identifiable type of

219. Id. at 13.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 14.
222. Mahoney, supra note 13, at 14.
223. Loseke, supra note 213.
224. Id.
225. Coroner’s Inquest, Chief Coroner, Province of Ontario, Inquest Touching the Deaths of
Arlene May and Randy Joseph Iles, Jury Verdict and Recommendations (1998), available at
http://www.owjn.org/archive/arlene3.htm.
226. Reporter Mary Wiens, CBC Radio One (CBC radio broadcast, Mar. 20, 1998).
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woman who needs “help” from “the system.”227 Note that the reporter did not
refer to women who find themselves in a situation like this with a violent and
dangerous man or use some other such phrase that would engage a very
different representation of the same event.228 This is no mere terminological
quibble. Instead the reporter’s choice of language, “women like this,” speaks
volumes about the unarticulated assumptions which pervade popular
representations of violence against women and which play on implicit
(sometimes explicit) stereotypes about which women and which “types” of
women get battered.
Even many feminist writers deploy the category and language of “victims”
uncritically, as if it were possible to speak of, analyse, and describe a sub-set of
the female population that are victimized and brutalized by men in the
“privacy” of their intimate heterosexual relationships and that to whom
services, policy initiatives, and most of all, sympathy should be extended.
However well meaning, there is usually an implicit sub-text operating in
writings that address the needs, experiences or issues facing “battered women.”
It is that “they” are not us.
The language used to describe women who have experienced battering,
therefore, is often problematic at best, patronizing at worst. In addition to the
descriptions of “battered women” as helpless and passive advanced through the
use “battered woman syndrome,” some writers inadvertently reveal an attitude
of condescension towards women who have been assaulted.229 Donald Downs,
for example, advances an analysis purportedly sympathetic to the dilemmas
facing women who are assaulted.230 Although he is harshly critical of the
“battered woman syndrome” precisely because it denigrates women, in one
part of his book he writes that “battered women may have broken wings.”231
While he is obviously speaking metaphorically here, through this language
Downs is nevertheless guilty of evoking the stereotypical image of the
damaged and “broken” “battered woman,” an image he ostensibly seeks to
overcome.
The very notion, therefore, that there exists a profile of a typical “battered
woman” carries with it an implicit separation of women into groups, as they
are divided into those who have been victimized in this way and those who
have not. This not only homogenizes the diversity of women (from all age,
ethnic, cultural, and socio-economic strata) who have experienced violence in
an intimate relationship with a male partner, but it also stigmatizes those
women identified as “victims” of this violence and discourages women from

227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

Id.
Id.
Loseke, supra note 213.
Downs, supra note 69, at 3.
Id. at 98 (emphasis added).
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disclosing their experiences for fear of this stigmatization. Mahoney’s
hesitations expressed immediately after identifying her own history of violence
speaks powerfully to this dilemma.232
Dominant narratives commonly deployed to describe violence against
women tend to engage in a totalizing discourse on “victims.” Through the use
of the “battered woman syndrome,” for example, the woman’s status as
“victim” becomes reified. She is at once defined – the “battered woman” –
entirely in terms of her relationship to the man’s violence against her and at the
same time pathologized through a psychological account of her incapacity and
paralysis. In this way, an enduring stereotype of the “battered woman” is
constructed, one which lumps together women from an incredible diversity of
life situations, unites them solely by virtue of the commonality of the
experience of violence perpetrated by their male partners, and obliterates
recognition of their resistance, agency, and survival skills in one fell swoop.
B.

Blaming “Battered Women” for “Failing to Exit:”233 Rendering
Inequality Invisible

The popular and legal preoccupation with women’s “failure” to leave, or
what Martha Mahoney calls “exit,”234 obscures the conditions of inequality in
women’s lives which make the “freedom” to leave chimerical. For example,
recent research suggests that of women who have ended relationships with
violent male partners, approximately one third will be assaulted again by these
same ex-partners, demonstrating that leaving the relationship is no guarantee of
ending the violence.235 Similarly, using the criminal justice system is no
guarantee of ending the violence in women’s lives, not only because the
system often cannot deliver on its promise to keep women safe, but also
because violent men often retaliate against women who report to police and/or
who testify in court. Seen in this light, the decisions made by assaulted women
who are “uncooperative victims” make much more sense.
Indeed, in sharp contrast to the prevailing social belief that if a woman
simply “leaves” her abusive male intimate she can thereby exercise control and
stop the violence, women are at highest risk for being killed in the aftermath of
separation.236 In Canada, a spate of highly publicized intimate femicides
occurred in Ontario in the summer of 2000, making this point painfully clear,
232. Mahoney, supra note 13, at 8.
233. See generally Martha R. Mahoney, Exit: Power and the Idea of Leaving in Love, Work,
and the Confirmation Hearings, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1283 (1992).
234. Id. at 1283.
235. Ruth E. Fleury et al., When Ending the Relationship Does Not End the Violence, 6
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1363, 1377 (2000).
236. Margo Wilson et al., Uxoricide in Canada: Demographic Risk Patterns, 35 CAN. J.
CRIMINOLOGY 263, 386 (1993); Margo Wilson & Martin Daly, Spousal Homicide, JURISTAT,
March 1994, at 1, 7.
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and prompting much media discussion about domestic violence and murder.237
What is most striking about these highly visible cases – one of which involved
a woman being fatally shot after handing her baby over to neighbours who
attempted to intervene to save her – is not only that the women had already left
their abusive spouses but also that they had repeatedly called upon a variety of
state agencies and services, including the police, for assistance and
protection.238 This speaks to what some commentators have described as the
“rhetoric of protection” offered by the state239 to women survivors of sexual
violence.240
This expectation that women should simply leave, combined with the
profound inadequacy of support services, legal protection, and economic
resources available to them, creates another classic double bind for women: if
they “stay,” they are blamed for the violence and not doing anything about it,
but if they “leave” they are often at greater risk for more violence or even
death. Yet this expectation of “exit” not only permeates popular consciousness
and discourse surrounding the problem of violence in intimate relationships, it
also deeply affects legal images of women who have been assaulted241 and
shapes legal responses to the problem in a number of ways.
Christine Littleton observes how this operates in legal arenas to women’s
detriment:
In Walker’s account of learned helplessness, the cause (random, uncontrollable
violence inflicted by men) is at least part of the “syndrome.” In the case law,
the cause disappears while the syndrome remains. In neither case, however, is
the focus explicitly and continuously placed where it belongs – on the
intolerable conditions under which women live.242

As Littleton argues, through the “battered woman syndrome,” women’s
victimization becomes transformed into something about the women
themselves and allows the legal system to avoid grappling with the

237. See, e.g., Chris Wood, Why Do Men Do It? A Recent Spate of Brutal Murders Spurs
Debate over Disturbing New Theories about Male Violence, MACLEAN’S, August 7, 2000, at 3435.
238. Id. at 35.
239. See generally Jalna Hanmer & Elizabeth Stanko, Stripping Away the Rhetoric of
Protection: Violence to Women, Law and the State in Britain and the U.S.A., 13 INT’L J.
SOCIOLOGY L., 357 (1985).
240. Ontario Women’s Justice Network, Hadley Inquest Jury Recommendations, at
http://www.owjn.org/issues/w-abuse/hadley2.htm (Feb. 20, 2002).
241. Christine A. Littleton, Women’s Experience and the Problem of Transition: Perspectives
on Male Battering of Women, 1989 U. CHI LEGAL FORUM 23, 37 (1989); Elizabeth M. Schneider,
Women’s Self-Defense Work and the Problem of Expert Testimony on Battering, 14 WOMEN’S
RTS. L. REP. 213, 216-18 (1992).
242. Littleton, supra note 241, at 42.
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fundamental dynamics of men’s violence, men’s greater social power and
gender inequalities.243
In an impossible double bind, women’s resistance strategies are not seen
by a model like the “battered woman syndrome” which stresses women’s
passivity and immobilization. Yet women are expected to resist in so far as the
requirement that women “leave” relationships with men in which they are
battered is a widely held conviction and expectation. And at the same time, if
they resist too much, or in the wrong area, for example, by exerting their will
by choosing not to proceed with or facilitate a criminal domestic violence
prosecution, they are punished and viewed as “uncooperative” and/or “bad”
victims.
The idea that if assaulted women do not “leave” they are culpable and
complicit in the violence perpetrated against them is evident in the popularity
of the concern about why “battered” women “stay” with men who assault them
and the oft-heard question “why doesn’t she just leave?” As Martha Mahoney
explains:
Once exit is defined as the appropriate response to abuse, then staying can be
treated as evidence that abuse never happened. If abuse is asserted, “failure”
to exit must then be explained. When that “failure” becomes the point of
inquiry, explanation in law and popular culture tends to emphasize
victimization and implicitly deny agency in the person who has been
harmed.244

In culture and in law, then, the idea that women always can, and always
should, simply “leave” reflects a view that sees agency without seeing the
limits on the scope of this very agency imposed by the conditions of inequality.
The social expectation that women should “leave” violent men also
obscures a range of other perhaps more important and compelling questions.
For example, what kinds of social and economic policies and resources would
make this option not merely an abstract possibility but a materially viable one
for women assaulted by their male intimates? What other kinds of
interventions might work to end the man’s violence against his female partner?
Why doesn’t he leave? Why are the current social interventions still aimed at
supporting her departure (i.e. the provision, inadequate as it is, of shelters for
assaulted women)? If answers to these questions were seriously engaged, we
would already be a considerable distance closer to eradicating men’s violence
against women and eliminating the social conditions in which is produced and
reproduced.

243. Id. at 38.
244. See Mahoney, supra note 233, at 1285.
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C. Widening the Lens and Transcending Dualisms: Seeing Agency and
Subordination in Women’s Experiences of Violence
Martha Mahoney’s acerbic observation that battered women have an
“image problem” in terms of how they are represented and constructed in the
legal system, perhaps most pointedly and eloquently captures the essence of
the problems surrounding legal responses to domestic violence.245 Speaking
specifically about the ways in which these representations impose
contradictions and hazards for “battered women” who are engaged in custody
battles with their violent male spouses for their children, Mahoney delineates
the double-edged sword women face in terms of legal expectations.246 As she
explains:
We need to be strong, resourceful, effective as a parent, meeting the needs of
the children when we appear in court. On the other hand, if we do that too
well, the court may disbelieve our stories because of stereotypes held by
judges or psychologists. If the court will consider violence as a factor at all in
custody decisions, we may be seen as – or in effect be required to appear as –
having been weak, helpless, and economically dependent to have “stayed” with
the man all these years.247

These “image problems” have far wider manifestations in law and in culture.
They speak to the radical individualization of experience and the systemic
denial of patterns and relations of social domination. This occurs not only in
terms of the social problem of men’s violence against women, but also in other
struggles waged to prove and protest inequality and discrimination.
The law’s relationship to complex social problems like violence against
women, then, is both critically important while it remains fundamentally
flawed. For as much as the law is a potent force for the realization of social
change and a necessary vehicle through which to advocate and struggle for
reform, the legal system continues to be mired in and shaped by the unequal
relations of gender, class, and race248 in which it seeks to intervene.
While understanding the pervasive social problem of violence against
women necessarily entails a recognition of the profound and often brutal ways
in which women are subordinated, a complete apprehension of this
phenomenon in women’s lives at both the macro and micro levels also requires
attention to the ways in which women seek to resist this violence. A failure to
acknowledge the ways in which women cope with, struggle against, and resist
the violence perpetrated against them risks defining women in terms of the

245. Mahoney, supra note 13, at 48-49.
246. Id. at 48.
247. Id. at 49.
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violence done to them and renders them objects of this violence rather than
subjects in relation to it.
VI. CONCLUSION
As Elizabeth Schneider has recently argued in her book, Battered Women
and Feminist Lawmaking:
[T]he contradictions of victimization are particularly profound in the area of
gender. Victim claims are the only way that women are heard, yet they trigger
entrenched stereotypes of passivity and purity . . . concepts of agency are also
limited and problematic. Traditional views of agency are based on notions of
individual choice and responsibility, individual will and action – perceptions of
atomized individuals, acting alone, unconstrained by social forces, unmediated
by social structures and systemic hardship.”249

These tensions are clearly visible in a critical exposition of the categories
of victims that underpin the “battered woman syndrome” and the
“uncooperative victim” in domestic violence cases.
The “battered woman syndrome” and the related concept of “learned
helplessness” fails to grasp the ways in which women who are assaulted are
often not at all incapacitated but are active in struggling against the violence.
Furthermore, these concepts individualize and psychologize what is
fundamentally a social and political problem with which women must contend
in the specific contexts of their individual lives. In this way, the “battered
woman syndrome” and “learned helplessness” models are ultimately both
decontextualized and individualized formulations of women’s experiences and
are severed from an analysis of the deeper structures of sexual inequality. The
use of the “battered woman syndrome” has shed light in legal contexts on
many of the profound psychological consequences of ongoing subjection to
violence in an intimate relationship. Yet it is premised on a depiction of
battered women as immobilized by the effects of the violence they have
suffered and fails to take into account the many creative, resourceful, and
ongoing ways in which women actively resist the violence perpetrated against
them. Fundamentally, then, it is by definition precluded from grasping the
reasonableness of an act of homicide perpetrated to defend against a fear of
being killed – a quintessential expression of agency in the context of
victimization some assaulted women make when confronted with threats
against their own lives.
Similarly, those women who are labeled as “uncooperative victims,” are
often seen as lacking credibility, “using” the system, difficult, and even
“manipulative.” They are not seen as reasonable actors who may have
extremely legitimate reasons for assessing the situation as one which does not

249. SCHNEIDER, supra note 190, at 76.
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reflect their assessment of their best interests and their own safety. Similar to
the “battered woman syndrome,” this depiction fails to question the causes and
consequences of the violence. Moreover, it embodies a corresponding
tendency to drop social context out of accounts of violence that remain
radically individualized. Finally, this depiction rests on an erroneous
assumption that legal responses, especially in terms of the criminal justice
system are, while perhaps needing some fine tuning, fundamentally appropriate
and adequate to the task of dealing with domestic violence.
As Schneider points out in relation to legal responses to domestic violence,
“the enormous credibility problems that women face as complainants and
witnesses seem almost insurmountable.”250 This is another way of invoking
the “image problems” assaulted women face in legal responses to domestic
violence. One of the fundamental ways in which we can move towards
eliminating these credibility problems is to discard images of victims of
domestic violence which fail to reflect a more adequate understanding of the
socially produced and individually lived nature of the problem. We need,
among other things, theoretical frameworks of violence in women’s lives
which are more focused on women’s strengths, resilience, and resistance as a
way to correct the pathologizing and stigmatizing discourses which construct
women as damaged, helpless, and irrational victims, as in the “battered woman
syndrome,” or as irrational and undeserving victims, as in the “uncooperative
victim.” Finally, we need a critical interrogation of the efficacy of the criminal
justice system response to domestic violence and its victims and a willingness
to address the discordance between its bureaucratic and procedural needs and
the needs of complex assaulted women. Only through more nuanced,
contextual accounts of the conditions of the lives of the women who are
victimized by domestic violence can we develop more effective policy and
legal interventions to deal with the problem of violence against women at both
the macro and the micro levels.

250. Id. at 83.

